Ultimate proof of Magnetic Vortex, free book and videos

[MileHigh]

Do I sense some hostility?

Please answer PW's question.

[TheoriaApophasis]

Do I sense some hostility?

Please answer PW's question.

it was answered 5 pages ago, the mag is not the same temp.



Not agreeing with the answer is not  "not answering the question".

[MileHigh]

Kenny:

Why do you see a faint reflection of yourself when you look through a glass window?

[Cap-Z-ro]

Boy, thats a great straight line.

I'll wait the appropriate time for Ken to take it tho.

Regards...

[TheoriaApophasis]

Kenny:

Why do you see a faint reflection of yourself when you look through a glass window?

Dont confuse yourself (empirical) with your Self (soul).        This is the idiots position in all metaphysics.


in ancient Pali it is   ESO KAYA NA ME SO ATTA"    (this body, myself, is not my SELF /Soul).    DN 2.154


"The reflection in the waters, is a reflection, not a reflection of your Self, but a reflection of another reflection of what is also not thyself" - Proclus





Copyright 2007  Ken L Wheeler

  The Buddhist term Anatman (Sanskrit), or Anatta (Pali) is an adjective in sutra used to refer to the nature of phenomena as being devoid of the Soul, that being the ontological and uncompounded subjective Self (atman) which is the "light (dipam), and only refuge" [DN 2.100]. Of the 662 occurrences of the term Anatta in the Nikayas, its usage is restricted to referring to 22 nouns (forms, feelings, perception, experiences, consciousness, the eye, eye-consciousness, desires, mentation, mental formations, ear, nose, tongue, body, lusts, things unreal, etc.), all phenomenal, as being Selfless (anatta). Contrary to countless many popular (=profane, or = consensus, from which the truth can 'never be gathered') books (as Buddhologist C.A.F. Davids has deemed them 'miserable little books') written outside the scope of Buddhist doctrine, there is no "Doctrine of anatta/anatman" mentioned anywhere in the sutras, rather anatta is used only to refer to impermanent things/phenomena as other than the Soul, to be anatta, or Self-less (an-atta).
     Specifically in sutra, anatta is used to describe the temporal and unreal (metaphysically so) nature of any and all composite, consubstantial, phenomenal, and temporal things, from macrocosmic to microcosmic, be it matter as pertains the physical body, the cosmos at large, including any and all mental machinations which are of the nature of arising and passing. Anatta in sutra is synonymous and interchangeable with the terms dukkha (suffering) and anicca (impermanent); all three terms are often used in triplet in making a blanket statement as regards any and all phenomena. Such as: "All these aggregates are anicca, dukkha, and anatta." It should be further noted that, in doctrine, that the only noun which is branded permanent (nicca), is obviously and logically so, the noun attan [Skt. Atman], such as passage (SN 1.169).
     Anatta refers specifically and only to the absence of the permanent soul as pertains any or all of the psycho-physical (namo-rupa) attributes, or khandhas (skandhas, aggregates). Anatta/Anatman in the earliest existing Buddhist texts, the Nikayas, is an adjective, (A is anatta, B is anatta, C is anatta). The commonly (=profane, consensus, herd-views) held belief to wit that: "Anatta means no-soul, therefore Buddhism taught that there was no soul" is an irrational absurdity which cannot be found or doctrinally substantiated by means of the Nikayas, the suttas (Skt. Sutras), of Buddhism.
     The Pali compound term and noun for "no soul" is natthatta (literally "there is not/no[nattha]+atta'[Soul]), not the term anatta, and is mentioned at Samyutta Nikaya 4.400, where Gotama was asked if there "was no-soul (natthatta)", to which Gotama equated this position to be a Nihilistic heresy (ucchedavada). Common throughout Buddhist sutra (and Vedanta as well) is the denial of psycho-physical attributes of the mere empirical self to be the Soul, or confused with same. The Buddhist paradigm (and the most common repeating passage in sutta) as regards phenomena is "Na me so atta" (this/these are not my soul), this most common utterance of Gotama the Buddha in the Nikayas, where "na me so atta" = Anatta/Anatman. In sutta, to hold the view that there was "no-Soul" (natthatta) is = natthika (nihilist). Buddhism differs from the "nothing-morist" (Skt. Nastika, Pali natthika) in affirming a spiritual nature that is not in any wise, but immeasurable, inconnumerable, infinite, and inaccessible to observation; and of which, therefore, empirical science can neither affirm nor deny the reality thereof of him who has 'Gone to That[Brahman]" (tathatta). It is to the Spirit (Skt. Atman, Pali attan) as distinguished from oneself (namo-rupa/ or khandhas, mere self as = anatta) i.e., whatever is phenomenal and formal (Skt. and Pali nama-rupa, and savinnana-kaya) "name and appearance", and the "body with its consciousness". [SN 2.17] 'Nonbeing (asat, natthiti [views of either sabbamnatthi 'the all is ultimately not' (atomism), and sabbam puthuttan 'the all is merely composite' [SN 2.77] both of this positions are existential antinomies, and heresies of annihilationism])'". In contrast it has been incorrectly asserted that affirmation of the atman is = sassatavada (conventionally deemed 'eternalism'). However the Pali term sasastavada is never associated with the atman, but that the atman was an agent (karmin) in and of samsara which is subject to the whims of becoming (bhava), or which is meant kammavada (karma-ism, or merit agencyship); such as sassatavada in sutta = "atta ca so loka ca" (the atman and the world [are one]), or: 'Being (sat, atthiti [views of either sabbamatthi 'the all is entirety', and sabbamekattan 'the all is one's Soul' [SN 2.77] both are heresies of perpetualism]). Sasastavada is the wrong conception that one is perpetually (sassata) bound within samsara and that merit is the highest attainment for either this life or for the next. The heretical antinomy to nihilism (vibhava, or = ucchedavada) is not, nor in sutta, the atman, but bhava (becoming, agencyship). Forever, or eternal becoming is nowhere in sutta identified with the atman, which is "never an agent (karmin)", and "has never become anything" (=bhava). These antinomies of bhava (sassatavada) and vibhava (ucchedavada) both entail illogical positions untenable to the Vedantic or Buddhist atman; however the concept of "eternalism" as = atman has been the fallacious secondary crutch for supporting the no-atman commentarialists position on anatta implying = there is no atman.
     Logically so, according to the philosophical premise of Gotama, the initiate to Buddhism who is to be "shown the way to Immortality (amata)" [MN 2.265, SN 5.9], wherein liberation of the spirit/mind [Greek = nous] (cittavimutta; Greek = epistrophe) is effectuated thru the expansion of wisdom and the meditative practices of sati and samadhi (assimilation, or synthesis, complete disobjectification with all objective [unreal] 'reality'), must first be educated away from his former ignorance-based (avijja) materialistic proclivities in  that he (the common fool) "saw any of these forms, feelings, this body in whole or part, to be my Self/Atman, to be that which I am by nature". Teaching the via negativa methodology of anatta in sutta pertains solely to things phenomenal, which were: "subject to perpetual change; therefore unfit to declare of such things 'these are mine, these are what I am, that these are my Soul'" [MN 1.232]. The one scriptural passage where Gotama is asked by a layperson what the meaning of anatta is as follows: [Samyutta Nikaya 3.196] At one time in Savatthi, the venerable Radha seated himself and asked of the Blessed Lord Buddha: "Anatta, anatta I hear said venerable. What pray tell does Anatta mean?" "Just this Radha, form is not the Soul (anatta), sensations are not the Soul (anatta), perceptions are not the Soul (anatta), assemblages are not the Soul (anatta), consciousness is not the Soul (anatta). Seeing thusly, this is the end of birth, the Brahman life has been fulfilled, what must be done has been  done."
     Anatta as taught in the Nikayas has merely relative value as it is directly conducive to Subjective awakening, or illumination; it is not an absolute one. It does not say or imply simply that the Soul (atta, Atman) has no reality, but that certain things (5 aggregates), with which  the unlearned man (fool = puthujjana, as is always implied in spiritual texts, a materialist) identifies himself, are not the Soul (anatta) and that is why one should grow disgusted with them, become detached from them and be liberated. This principle of the extremely abused and misunderstood term anatta does not negate the Soul as such, but denies Selfhood to those things that constitute the non-self (anatta), showing them thereby to be empty of any ultimate value and to be repudiated; instead of nullifying the Atman (Soul) doctrine, it in fact compliments and affirms it in the most logical method by which Subjective gnosis is initially gained; that by and thru objective negation. It has been said that: 'No Indian school of thought has ever regarded the human soul (another error, since the soul is not a possession of, nor is of the nature of the persona, or 'human') or the carrier of human personal (persona [Bob, Larry, Sue] is never confused by the Metaphysician, with the Person/Atman/Purisha) identity as a permanent substance (literally meaning, absurdly "permanent impermanence [substance]")', which is certainly true when referring to the empirical persona (mere self [aggregates/namorupa], as opposed to the Person, spirit, atman), that 'ensouled' being, as was common in old English to say: "late at night, not a soul (mere person) was to be seen walking about". That the atman is not to be understood as a cartesian thinking substance, phenomena, or eternal soul, is certainly the case, and logically cannot be otherwise.
     It cannot be missed that in so discussing the commentarialist's position of a 'doctrine of anatta' that anatta is merely a qualifier of something else and that anatta in and of itself in standalone is utterly meaningless and untenable to speak or make mention of an 'anatta doctrine' without qualification of what, and in what context, anatta is being qualified of X (the afore mentioned 22 things of which anatta is said to equal) i.e. that which is defacto equivalent to or with anatta. That anatta in doctrine is aught but ever equivalent to what is evil, foul, disgusting, phenomenal and repulsive, to therefore make declaration that, as many fool "buddhists" (in name only) have done,  "anatta is a core tenant of Buddhism" cannot be enjoined, since the principle upon which Buddhism was founded is the quest for the immortal (amatagamimagga SN 5.9), and the unceasing bliss as gained by and thru liberation in wisdom's culmination.  Anatta is, obviously so, a key principle in the doctrine of Buddhism (and other via negativa systems, of which Advaita also makes extensive use of the term anatman) and the metaphysics thereof quantify anatta and being meant all physical and mental consubstantial and temporal objectivity; all compounded things either in simplex (matter, hyle) or complex (mental). As an-atta is meant not-Subject (=object [phenomena]), those things, as Buddhism declares "the unlearned fool bemuses himself as being (those things)". "What do you suppose, followers, if people were carrying off into the Jeta grove bunches of sticks, grasses, branches, and leaves and did with them as they wished or burned them up, would it occur to you: These people are carrying us off, are doing as they please with us, and are burning us? No, indeed not Lord. And how so? Because Lord, none of that is our Soul, nor what our Soul subsists upon! Just so followers, what is not who you are, do  away with it, when you have made done with that, it will lead to your bliss and welfare for as long as time lasts. What is that you are not? Form, followers, is not who you are, neither are sensations, perceptions, experiences, consciousness" [MN 1.141]. Just as 'disgusting (anatta) doctrine' cannot make logical sense, neither does 'anatta doctrine' bring light to studiers of Buddhism what anatta is contextually or its philosophical importance as being merely a qualifier of that which is evil, foul, disgusting, phenomenal and repulsive (= anatta). Anatta is of course a doctrinal tenant within Buddhism used to earmark phenomena, however as conventionally and irrationally conceived, there is absolutely no such creature in Buddhism as a "no-Soul doctrine".
     What has Buddhism to say of the Self? "That's not my Self" (na me so atta); this, and the term "non Self-ishness" (anatta) predicated of the world and all "things" (sabbe dhamma anatta); Identical with the Brahmanical "of those who are mortal, there is no Self/Soul", (anatma hi martyah [SB., II. 2. 2. 3]). [KN J-1441] "The Soul is the refuge that I have gone unto". For anatta is not said of the Self/Soul but what it is not. There is never and nowhere in sutra, a 'doctrine of no-Soul', but a doctrine of what the Soul is not (form is anatta, feelings are anatta, etc.). It is of course true that the Buddha denied the existence of the mere empirical "self" in the very meaning of "my-self" (this person so-and-so, namo-rupa, an-atta, i.e. Bob, Sue, Larry etc.), one might say in accordance with the command 'denegat seipsum, [Mark VII.34]; but this is not what modern and highly unenlightened writers mean to say, or are understood by their readers to say; what they mean to say and do in fact say, is that the Buddha denied the immortal (amata), the unborn (ajata), Supreme-Self (mahatta'), uncaused (samskrta), undying (amara) and eternal (nicca) of the Upanishads. And that is palpably false, for he frequently speaks of this Self, or Spirit (mahapurisha), and nowhere more clearly than in the too often repeated formula 'na me so atta', "This/these are not my Soul" (na me so atta'= anatta/anatman), excluding body (rupa) and the components of empirical consciousness (vinnana/ nama), a statement to which the words of Sankhara are peculiarly apposite, "Whenever we deny something unreal, is it in reference to something real" [Br. Sutra III.2.22]; since it was not for the Buddha, but for the nihilist (natthika), to deny the Soul. For, [SN 3.82] "yad anatta....na me so atta, "what is anatta...(means) that is not my Atman"; the extremely descriptive illumination of all thing which are Selfless (anattati) would be both meaningless and a waste of much time for Gotama were (as the foolish commentators espousing Buddhism's denial of the atman) to clarify and simplify his sermons by outright declaring 'followers, there is no atman!', however no such passage exists. The Pali for said passage would be: 'bhikkhave, natthattati!'; and most certainly such a passage would prove the holy grail and boon for the Theravadin nihilists (materialists) who have 'protesteth too much' that Buddhism is one in which the atman is rejected, but to no avail or help to their untenable views and position by the teachings themselves.
     Outside of going into the doctrines of later schisms of Buddhism, such as Sarvastivada, Theravada, Vajrayana, Madhyamika, and lastly Zen, the oldest existing texts (Nikayas) of Buddhism which predate all these later schools of Buddhism [The Sanchi and Bharut inscriptions (aka the Pillar edicts) unquestionably dated to the middle of the second century B.C.E. push the composition of the 5 Nikayas back to a earlier date by mentioning the word "pañcanekayika" (Five Nikyas), thereby placing the Nikayas as put together (no later than) at a period about half way between the death of the Buddha and the accession of Asoka (before 265 B.C.), as such the 5 Nikayas, the earliest existing texts of Buddhism, must have been well known and well established far earlier than generally perceived. Finally proving the majority of the five Nikayas could not have been composed any later than the very earliest portion of the third century B.C.E.], anatta is never used pejoratively in any sense in the Nikayas by Gotama the Buddha, who himself has said: [MN 1.140] "Both formerly and now, I've never been a nihilist (vinayika), never been one who teaches the annihilation of a being, rather taught only the source of suffering (that being avijja, or nescience/agnosis), and its ending (avijja)." Further investigation into negative theology is the reference by which one should be directed as to a further understanding of this 'negative' methodology which the term anatta illuminates. It should be noted with great importance that the founder of Advaita Vedanta, Samkara used the term anatman lavishly in the exact same manner as does Buddhism, however in all of time since his passing, none have accused Samkara of espousing a denial of the Atman. Such as: "Atma-anatma vivekah kartavyo bandha nuktaye"-"The wiseman should discriminate between the Atman and the non-Atman (anatman) in order to be liberated." [Vivekacudamani of Samkara v. 152], "Anatman cintanam tyaktva kasmalam duhkah karanam, vintayatmanam ananda rupam yan-mukti karanam."-"Give up all that is non-Atman (anatman), which is the cause of all misery, think only of the Atman, which is blissful and the locus of all liberation." [Vivekacudamani of Samkara v. 379], "Every qualifying characteristic is, as the non-Atman (anatman), comparable to the empty hand." [Upadisa Sahasri of Samkara v. 6.2], "the intellect, its modifications, and objects are the non-Atman (anatman)." [Upadisa Sahasri of Samkara v. 14.9], "The gain of the non-Atman (anatman) is no gain at all. Therefore one should give up the notion that one is the non-Atman (anatman)." [Upadisa Sahasri of Samkara v. 14.44]. In none of the Buddhist suttas is there support for "there is no-atman" theories of anatta . The message is simply to cease regarding the very khandhas in those terms by which the notion of atman has, itself, been so easily misconstrued. As has been shown, detaching oneself from the phenomenal desire for the psycho-physical existence was also a central part of Samkara's strategy. There is, hence, nothing in the suttas that Samkara, the chief proponent of Advaita Vedanta, would have disagreed with.
     Due to sectarian (and secular) propagation of commentary over that of doctrine, and more still a nominalized, or neutered mistranslation of the original Pali texts, a general acceptance of the concept of "A Doctrine of Anatta" exists as a status quo, however there exists no substantiation for same in sutta for Buddhism's denial of the atman, or in using the term anatta in anything but a positive sense in denying Self-Nature, the Soul, to any one of a conglomeration of corporeal and empirical phenomena which were by their very transitory nature,  "impermanent (anicca), suffering (dukkha), and Selfless (anatta)". The only noun in sutra which is referred to as "permanent (nicca)" is the Soul, such as Samyutta Nikaya 1.169. Buddhism's 'na me so atta' is no more a denial of the Atman than is Socrates' 'to...soma....ouk estin ho anthropos' (the body is not the Man [Aniochus 365]) is a denial of the Man. Young men asked Gotama as to the whereabouts of a woman they were seeking to which he replied "What young men do you think, were it not better for you to seek the Atman (atmanam gavis) than a woman?" [Vin 1.23]. In fact the term "Anatmavada" is a concept utterly foreign to Buddhist sutta, existing in only non-doctrinal Theravada, in some Mahayana, and Madhyamika commentaries. As the truism holds, a "lie repeated often enough over time becomes the truth". Those interested parties incident to learning of Buddhism are most often incapable of pouring through endless gigantic piles of Buddhist doctrine, and have therefore defacto accepted the commentarial-based trash, the notion of a "doctrine of anatta (or often said "no soul doctrine")" as key to Buddhism itself, when in fact there exists not one citation of this untenable and irrational concept in either the Digha, Majjhima, Samyutta, Anguttara, or Khuddaka Nikayas. Unless evoking a fallacy, we who seek out Buddhism sans the commentarialists slants and opinion-based musings, must stick strictly to sutta as reference, wherein the usage of anatta never falls outside of the parameter of merely denying Self or Soul to the profane and transitory phenomena of temporal and samsaric life which is "subject to arising and passing", and which is most certain not (an) our Soul (atta). Certainly the most simple philosophically based logic would lead anyone to conclude that no part of this frail body is "my Self, is That which I am", is "not my Soul", of which Gotama the Buddha was wholeheartedly in agreement that no part of it was the Soul i.e. was in fact anatta. The spiritual and metaphysical adept is one who must be the "dead man walking" who has followed the commandment: "die before ye die!", and is one who has died to that (mere) self and lives in the Spirit, or the Self. This is the discernment between the Great Self (mahatta) and little self (alpatman); or the fair Self (kalyanatta) from the foul self (papatta).
     The perfect contextual usage of anatta in sutta: "Whatever form, feelings, perceptions, experiences, or consciousness there are (the five aggregates), these he sees to be without permanence, as suffering, as ill, as a plague, a boil, a sting, a pain, an affliction, as foreign, as otherness, as empty (suññato), as Selfless (anattato). So he turns his mind (citta) away from these and gathers his mind/will within the realm of Immortality (amataya dhatuya). This is tranquility; this is that which is most excellent!" [MN 1.436]. The Buddha never considered the atman to be micchaditthi (wrong view). If the Buddha disbelieved in an atman (soul) why did he not deny the atman unambiguously? There is no such denial.
     By denying outright the soul, by default, the Theravadins, western 'scholars' examining Buddhism, and modern "buddhists" imply that the five aggregates are ultimate.  This of course is absurd.  They have merely shifted Buddhism to an empiricism by ignoring pro-atman statements.  According to them, what is real is what makes sensory knowledge possible, namely, the five aggregates which, ironically, according to the canon, are = Mara, or evil (papa); [SN 3.195] "Mara = five khandhas (empirical self)". It begs the question to assume that the no-soul doctrine had been established at the beginning of the Buddha's ministry and that the atman (soul) was, in every respect, an abhorrent term.  Still, for such a supposedly abhorrent term, there are innumerable, are countless positive instances of atman used throughout the Nikayas, especially used in compounds which are easily glossed over by a prejudicial commentator and nominalist translators.  In meeting these instances, not surprisingly, these same prejudicial translators have erected a theory that the atman is purely a reflexive pronoun.  The lexical rule that atman (Pali: attan) is to be used strictly in a pronominal fashion, or simply should be used as a signifier for the finite body, is unwarranted. Scholars like C.A.F. Davids, Conze, Humphrey, Schrader, Horner, Pande, Coomarswamy, Radhakrishnan, Sogen, Suzuki, Julius Evola, and Nakamura, just to name some important scholars, disagree with the claim that Buddha categorically denied an eternal (nicca) soul, whose teachings then, would be classified as Annihilationist and Materialist. In fact there are utterly none living or dead who have examined the original texts in detail whilst refraining from sectarian and commentarial explanations and concluded Buddhism has in any way denied the atman thru and by means of the usage of the term anatta or otherwise. The fatally determined conglomeration which comprises the temporal body "headed for the grave" is not in dispute and is what is meant by anatta. To this there can be no opposition since all forms of metaphysics cry out for a "freedom from (that mere) self", as Buddhism is in full agreement: [Dhm. 147] "Behold! That painted puppet this body, riddled with oozing sores, an erected façade. Diseased heap that fools fancy and swoon over; True Essence is not part of it! For the body befalls utter destruction, [Dhm. 148] "This body is soon worn out. It is that very same abode for disease and sicknesses that is broken apart. The body is soon cast away, that very putrid heap. It is always in death that life meets its end!", [Dhm. 150] "Behold! This city of bones, plastered together with flesh and blood. Within its walls are old age and death. Pride, arrogance, and hypocrisy are its townsfolk!", [MN 1.185] "What of this short-lived body which is clung to by means of craving? There is nothing in it to say 'I' or 'mine' or 'me'."
     The term anatman is found not only in Buddhist sutras, but also in the Upanishads and lavishly so in the writings of Samkara as mentioned earlier. Anatman is a common via negativa (neti neti, not this, not that) teaching method common to Vedanta, Neoplatonism, Buddhism, early Christian mystics, and others, wherein nothing affirmative can be said of what is "beyond speculation, beyond words, and concepts" thereby eliminating all positive characteristics that might be thought to apply to the Soul, or be attributed to it; to wit that the Subjective ontological Self-Nature (svabhava / atman) can never be known objectively, but only thru "the denial of all things which it (the Soul) is not"- Meister Eckhart. This doctrine is also called by the Greeks Apophasis. Via negativa can only go so far, such that the Subject (Witness/Atman) cannot be negated (Subject precedes any object of negation, even and also false attempts at Subject/Witness negation [=nihilism]). Objective negation culminates in Subjective gnosis and liberation, not to mention is the most expedient means to Atman-realization (atmanbodhi, cittavimutta, pannavimutta, etc.). Just as a fool might, for hundreds of hours, pick thru a pile of straw (phenomena) in search of a needle (atman), the wisest of men, in mere seconds, lights a match to the phenomena (straw) which quickly burns and blows away, leaving before his feet the needle sought; and this is of course part of the expediency as core to the via negativa methodology.
     Modern Buddhism (so-called, not that it is Buddhism in any way) labors under the heinous delusion that from the outset there is no immaterial and ontological soul, or atman in the system of Buddhism and therefore the only logical conclusion from this false premise is that Buddhism is merely a profane moral Humanism based in compassionate empirical idealism, 'liberation but no Liberant', and this is palpably false. Under the guise of a more polished form of physicalism or rather, Atheism, a mere qualifier of objective phenomena, anatta, has overrun a noetic metaphysics, Buddhism, based in extracting the nous (spirit, citta, Self) from the objective cosmos (=anatta) wherein it has been miserably immersed since time immemorial as due to the attribute of the Absolute (Brahman, Greek = Hen), that being avijja (agnosis, nescience, as is philosophically meant Emanationism). Avijja (a+vijja [atman]) and anatta (an+atman) in no way differ, such that both refer to the beginningless privation, or objectivity immanent to the Absolute. Overcoming this objective desire (tanha) and enthrallment which constitute what is meant by anatta, is vijja (illumination), or conventionally liberation (vimutta, vijjavimutta); namely the only connection between atman and anatta is that of avijja to which Buddhism's endgoal is pannavimutta (liberation via wisdom) in which avijja has no longer any footing; where avijja is not present, so too is anatta absent, this is the very Tathagata (gone to Brahman, or That), the same 'dead man walking', he who has 'died before he has (physically) died'. Like the ancient riddle about the fool "who rides upon horseback looking to and fro for a horse, and seeing none, denies that horses exist", so too is modern buddhism inept and impotent in 'seeing' that the focus is the Witness (atman), that very Subject which cannot be known (empirical knowledge) objectively, but which can be Known (gnosis, wisdom); thereby effectuating "liberation", "immortality" (amata), and the declaration that "this is my last life".
     That myself or anyone need go into such extensive and repetitive detail about a simple term, anatta, which now corruptly forms the basis of modern Buddhism, only demonstrates the heights from which original Buddhism has fallen severely over the past 2400 years. Like an ancient city in the jungle overgrown with vines and weeds, shat upon by nesting birds, and inhabited by fanged monkeys who fling their feces at visitors, modern "buddhism" attracts only the mentally perverse, often spiritually suicidal, who wrongly see superficially something noble in a soulless nihilistic Humanistic idealism. 




The Two Selves
Copyright 2007 Ken L Wheeler

     The greatest fool in Buddhist doctrine was one who "saw Self (atman) in (mere) self (anatta)" ("anattani ca attati") [AN 2.52], certainly one of the most common refrains in Buddhist sutta. Some of the greatest harbingers of the incapacity to differentiate the empirical (namo-rupic) self from The Self are most certainly the 'Buddhists' who never end in revelry of quoting Gotama to the effect that all 'phenomena are Selfless (anattoti)'. The empirical self is = anatta, [SN 3.196], that very khandic (namo-rupic) self which modern 'Buddhism' alone acknowledges, but not that other Self which is the "light and refuge" [DN 2.154].
     What has Buddhism to say of the Self? "That's not my Self" (na me so atta); and the term "non Self-ishness" (anatta) are predicated of the world and all "things" (sabbe dhamma anatta); identical with the Brahmanical "of those who are mortal, there is no Self/Soul", (anatma hi martyah), [SB., II. 2. 2. 3]). [KN J-1441] "The Soul is the refuge that I have gone unto". For anatta is not said of the Self/Soul but what it is not. There is never a 'doctrine of no-Soul', but a doctrine of what the Soul (The Self) is not (form is anatta, feelings are anatta, etc.). It cannot be denied that what is anatta is indeed the mere and petty self for [SN 3.196], and countless other passages, the mere self of psycho-physicality is = anatta = khandhas; that same self which the disciple is instructed to have his will (ctta) reject in the face of illumination and insight.
     Of the Metaphysician, the common-fool (puthujjana) who knows "only of his self, is fated to most certainly die when his time comes", but of that noble Aryan sage who has claimed the summit of wisdom and is "freed the will/nous (cittavimuttati)", he is a "dead man walking"; meaning he has "died to that mere self and lives in The Self". Such a person in quest for same is commanded "die before ye die!", or that before physical death come and lest you still suffer the delusion of The Self to be this (foul) self of flesh and bone you have dispirited and disobjectified the will (Self-assimilation = Atman) in upon itself (samadhi, liberation).
     The common fool who ruminates over immortality envisages the survival of the personality (of person so-and-so; Bob, Sue); confusing the empirical self of "flesh, urine, blood, bone, feces" [Dhm] with the Spirit (atman). This empirical self is in doubt by none, that very same self "headed to the grave" and which "goes in its own time". The Metaphysician knows that any 'self' created in time must also perish in those same ("fires of") time. [Dhm. 147] "Behold! That painted puppet this body, riddled with oozing sores, an erected façade. Diseased heap that fools fancy and swoon over"; of which Buddhism in no way quarrels with modern and corrupt 'Buddhism', that of which this very self, the temporal phenomena of that person so-and-so is equally as much 'dukkha, anicca, and anatta".
     The 'reflexive position' taken by illogical modern 'Buddhism' proclaims the Pali term Attan (Skt. Atman, Self) to be merely a reflexive term meaning "oneself, himself, herself", however the reflexive and empirical mere self is, regardless of translation, "anatta" i.e. "na me so atta" (not my Soul), or also "eso khandhassa na me so atta" (these aggregates [forms, feelings, perceptions, experiences, consciousness =mere self] are no the Self, the Soul). As pertains the reflexive self, of who proclaim "myself, himself, herself" we are referring to "that person so-and-so (Larry, Sue, etc.)", the empirical and psycho-physical (namo-rupa) self of blood and sinew which is "doomed to fall into the grave at long last", the very same self the poetic dead are said to cry out to the living "what you are, we (the dead) once were,. what we are you shall be!". Even more illogical is the double standard of commentarialist and sectarian 'Buddhists' who desire anatta to mean 'no-Soul' as well as atta to mean simply 'myself, himself, herself'; wherein illogically atta in the adjective anatta is, to their ignorant minds = Soul ('no-soul'), but atta in standalone  = 'myself'. As illogical an end result, modern Buddhism has proclaimed atta = anatta! Its quite hard to fathom any position more senseless than this, however this is one of the countless reasons modern 'Buddhism' is illogical without end. However doctrinally and logically so, what IS anatta (the five psycho-physical aggregates of the mere self) are indeed 'myself', in so meaning the mortal (mata) self composed of the bodily humors which is fated to death. That mere self is never implied nor meant when Buddhism speaks of immortality and the path leading to same (amatagamimagga) [SN 5.9], of which "the body cannot pass that gate to fare beyond,..only the Soul (The Self)" - Homer
     The great dictum of the Upanishads is "That (Brahman) thou art" (tat tvam asi). "That" is here, of course, the Atman or Spirit, Sanctus Spiritus, the Greek pneuma; this Atman is the spiritual essence, impartite whether transcendent or immanent; and however many and various directions to which it may extend or from which it may withdraw, it is the unmoved mover in both intransitive and transitive senses. It lends itself to all modalities of being but never itself becomes anyone or anything. That than which all else is vexation- That thou art. "That", in other words, is Brahman, or Godhead in the general sense of Logos or Being, considered as the universal source of all Being. That which is "in" him as the finite (1) in the infinite (2-infinity, i.e. phenomena, namo-rupa), though not a "part" of him.
     Referring back to "of those who are mortal, there is no Self/Soul", the common fool doesn't 'have' an atman as such that we might agree with heretical modern 'Buddhism' which denies Selfhood in the absolute; for those same peoples who, in the grand bloom of ignorance, accept the foul self and deny the Great-Self, they are objectively (self-khandhas) assured that no underlying Subject (The Self) is immanent, or transcendent. Just as a man might have gold on his land, undiscovered and unknown, he has no gold, no wealth, even though it be his by measure of being present upon his very lands; so too those common fools (puthujjana), the 'Buddhists' who are certain and proud in their ignorance that this temporal personality, this self, is all there is. Theravada, in great illogic, goes one further to say that Gotama's denial of nihilism (ucchedavada) was aimed at meaning that even the empirical self, since it itself was merely a composite and temporal construct, had no existence to be annihilated; thereby subverting the doctrinal 'heresy of nihilism' to be placed upon the view of denying the empirical self rather than The Self, the Atman. Of course, to 'have an atman' implies possession, and certainly so the immanent Subject, The Self, is a possession by nothing and by nobody; in this too the wiseman agrees with the common materialist who ignorantly proclaims "I don't have an atman/Soul", most certainly that foul self does not 'have' The Self any more so than that object which is illuminated from afar 'has (of itself) light'.
     "There are two within us" [Plato's Republic 439d, 604b]; in the expression of "self-control" implying that there is one that controls and the other (self) subject to control, for we know that "nothing acts upon itself"; for the one self "becomes", and the other self "is". "The 'fair' self (kalyanam attanam)...the 'foul' self (papam attanam)" [AN 1.149]; i.e. the "great Self" (mahatta) and the "petty" (appatumo) [AN 1.249], or that "self whose Lord is the Self" [Dhm 380]. In that modern so-called Buddhism has denied The Self, it has constructed an illogical impossibility in thereby positing empirical purity of which the doctrine of Buddhism itself, not to mention logic alone most heartily protests, for there is no possibility of empirical purity within the teachings of Buddhism.
      It is of course true that the Buddha denied the existence of the mere empirical "self" in the very meaning of "my-self" (this person so-and-so, namo-rupa, an-atta), one might say in accordance with the command 'denegat seipsum, [Mark VII.34]; but this is not what modern so-called Buddhism means to say, or are understood by their readers to say; what they mean to say is that the Buddha denied the immortal (amata), the unborn (ajata) and Supreme-Self (mahatta') of the Upanishads. And that is palpably false, for he frequently speaks of this Self, or Spirit (mahapurisha), and nowhere more clearly than in the too often repeated formula 'na me so atta', "This/these are not my Soul" (na me so atta'= anatta/anatman), excluding body (rupa) and the components of empirical consciousness (vinnana/ nama). "What of this short-lived body which is clung to by means of craving? There is nothing in it to say 'I' or 'mine' or 'me'." [MN 1.185]. "What do you suppose, followers, if people were carrying off into the Jeta grove bunches of sticks, grasses, branches, and leaves and did with them as they wished or burned them up, would it occur to you: These people are carrying us off, are doing as they please with us, and are burning us? No, indeed not Lord. And how so? Because Lord, none of that is our Soul." [MN 1.141]. "What do you think, is form lasting or impermanent? Impermanent Gotama. Is that which is impermanent suffering or blissful? Indeed its suffering Gotama. Is that which is impermanent and suffering and subject to perpetual change; is it fit to declare of such things 'this is mine, this is what I am, this is my Soul? Indeed not Gotama!" [MN 1.232].
     Buddhism's command, same as that of Plotinus and the Pythagoreans before him, was the utter disobjectification  of the will by inversion of that primordial attribute which is uncaused and without beginning (attribute/avijja). For only the wise and illuminated fully know the two selves, differentiate the two by means of wisdom with which they are endowed, and certainly do not see "Self in what is (mere) self (anatta)".