Color's Kapanadze forum, FE builds circuits and comments

color · December 18, 2021, 10:20:16 AM

Лампа 65 ват горит от высокого напряжения
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6TNoUQ6T-VQ

The reason the above member stopped experimenting is probably the same as nnaill's.

nnail:
НА видео работает обыкновеный тл494+с драйвером ир2110 и все получаем меандыр- и обыкновеный гранана
http://zaryad.com/forum/threads/generator-btg-romana-karnouxova.8886/page-180

At that time, many members were deceived by nnaill and gave up the experiment.

color · December 18, 2021, 10:38:03 AM

The reason the above member stopped experimenting is probably the same as nnaill's.

nnail:
НА видео работает обыкновеный тл494+с драйвером ир2110 и все получаем меандыр- и обыкновеный гранана
http://zaryad.com/forum/threads/generator-btg-romana-karnouxova.8886/page-180

At that time, many members were deceived by nnaill and gave up the experiment.

http://zaryad.com/forum/threads/generator-btg-romana-karnouxova.8886/page-311
http://zaryad.com/forum/threads/generator-btg-romana-karnouxova.8886/page-312
http://zaryad.com/forum/threads/generator-btg-romana-karnouxova.8886/page-315

It is also nnaill who made my dad recite Pushkin's poetry in a Russian cafe.

삶이 그대를 속일지라도
Если жизнь тебя обманет,
슬퍼하거나 노여워 말라
Не печалься, не сердись.
슬픈 날에 참고 견디면
В день уныния смирись,
즐거운 날은 오고야 만다
День веселья, верь, настанет.

마음은 미래를 바라느니
Сердце в будущем живёт,
현재는 한없이 우울한 것
Настоящее уныло.
모든 것 하염없이 사라지나
Всё мгновенно, всё пройдет,
지나간 것은 그리움이 된다
Что пройдёт, то будет мило.

I repeat,
There is no trick inside Ruslan's yoke-transformer wrapped in yellow tape.

color · December 18, 2021, 12:50:03 PM

Лекция 8.11. Трансформатор
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3kHxUa3YTvg

It was recorded from the 2/3 point.

самый простой способ значит этот способ на самом деле давно давно известен но его к сожалению не применяют Ну по крайней мере в Народном хозяйстве на нём написано но ни одно рацпредложение я сам наблюдал как бы вот что многие товарищи буквально практически не опираясь ни на какие материалы исследуя самостоятельного трансформатор приходит к такому выводу на основе практике как правило Да и соответственно понимают чем это чревато то есть вот смотрите элементарное первое изменение частоты Ты серьёзно отразится на работе вот этого устройства раз и второе если я допустим обмотки намотаю часть обмоток в прямом а части обмотки встречное вот я их так Обозначил что допустим нас теперь вот то что они называют Да полем которое сконцентрирована в Магните точнее в сердечнике дай то есть если магнитное поле будет у нас ходить вот так раз-раз раз-раз уплотнение здесь наоборот зона как бы с меньшей плотностью и дальше на перемещаемся точно также на противоположную сторону что тогда у нас получится с вами чистоту я не поменял то есть я решил выполнить фокус с обмотками таким образом что получается мощность теперь которую можно снять с вот этого трансформатора образуя вот такие вот области Да она существенно увеличивается таким образом при том же сечении нашего так сказать сердечника мы можем пропускать через такого типа трансформаторы гораздо больше мощности если это применять на практике то соответственно это будет огромная экономия Ну то есть вот представьте себе увеличили мощность в 4 раза да а сердечник остался точно такой же это серьезная экономия и заслуживает достойного внимания Это по сути такой первый шаг к модернизации классического трансформатора и применяя даже вот такой вот элементарный метод ещё вот про это ничего пока не будем да Рассказывайте говорить мы существенно начинаем выигрывать поэтому штука делается очень легко Но все прекрасно понимаете что надо перемотать хотя бы одну из обмоток да и отрепетировать этот момент видят то как бы о чём я говорю Итак дорогие друзья я мы с вами определились да что поменяем вот эту величину посмотрим что у нас случится да Потом посмотрим что у нас с потоком внутри случится Да и попробуем со мордочками поиграться посмотрим что у нас получится да Ну вот с первой частью всё понятно и объяснял со второй частью тоже всё понятно и объяснял теперь давай я тебе занимаемся вот это вот счастью когда мы будем с вами менять частоту и посмотрим вот на первую часть что у нас будет Да И вот снимая нагрузочную характеристику с трансформатора Да мы имеем четкие диапазон указанный заводом-изготовителем Но получается я приобретаю прибор в виде трансформатора Да его начинаю использовать в тех режимах которые завод-изготовитель не описывает либо не рекомендуют использовать да почему я это делаю 1 то есть вот что показал мне опыт Ну допустим я думаю все из нас ходили в магазин и покупали ферритовые кольца Да на них мы там чего-то там мотаем кому что нужно и нравится да И нам говорят проницаемость это такая Да там диапазоне Что такое там и это всё по справочнику смотрим делаем и так далее Вот это всё ерунда на самом деле любой феррит покупаете он будет работать на любой частоте Абсолют проверено неоднократно Я единственное что пострадает пострадает просто передача потоку то есть какой мощность Я прокачаю то есть если оптимальный то соответственно будет указано и справочники передача мощности на этих частотах если мне начистоту задрать там в 10 раз больше этот же Philips всё будет работать Великолепно просто коэффициент передачи по току Тоесть да В итоге мощностные характеристики вот меньше не знаю вот это вы можете всё это делать нивелировать и протащить любой сигнал который Вам нужен всё вот это фишка номер один которую на практике я выяснил И просто-напросто вот я понимаю что многие не могут себе позволить то есть по каким-то причинам но банальная причина просто живу допустим где-то магазинов нет ничего нет а вот из того что есть якобы вроде не подходит всё подходит Ну либо может достать Да ну просто это ограниченность доступу до как ресурс поэтому не волнуйтесь всё получится Всё будет работать Итак делаем Focus частотой начинаем увеличивать частоту и смотрим на наши вольт-амперная характеристика То есть получается она у нас падает всё плохо как бы потом оп и на какое-то чистоте у нас опять поднимается передача и наш трансформатор начинает шикарно работать из-за чего это происходит на самом деле что вам никто никогда не рассказывает значит внутри вот опять буду рассказывать через классику потому что многих Что значит магия практически 100% учили до сих пор так хочет на своём канале расскажу как надо это всё дело читайте воспринимать значит Посмотрите образуется за счёт увеличения частоты у нас теперь не ходят Вот какие единичка в данном случае образуется два Вот таких вот как бы полукольца да вот этот циркуляция магнитного поля внутри сердечника и всё и у него 5 на очень такой высокой частоте всё хорошо начинает работать но пойми фу такой трансформатор мы теперь чётко понимаем какой нюанс возник у нас когда мы сделали такой фокус с нашим трансформатором оказывается что теперь положение обмоток должны быть чётко размещены на наших полу кольцах магнитного потока внутри сердечника то есть трансформатор у нас заработал снова но теперь чтобы его правильно намотать нужно обмотки чётко располагать вот таким образом хотел вам нарисовал то есть вводное хотите изменить частоту готовьтесь к тому что геометрия намотки она будет определяющая и вот многие Съешь ники забегая наперёд сразу скажу вот этого не знают фокусом смотрят на других у которых всё получается но не знаю вот этого фокуса мотают как обычный трансформатор не понимая что любое нарушение геометрии от авторского приведёт к фатальной ошибки То есть к тому что аппарат вы никогда не запустить и у нас никогда не заработают вот такое маленькое дополнение теперь дальше я усугубляй у меня опять кручу частоту опять слетаю с нормальной характеристики нагрузочной меня опять тут непонятно что происходит потом у меня четыре образуется в таких вот Бублика Да это я их называю вот четыре области хождения всё чем больше областей тем выше требования к геометрии намоток которая должна быть размещена только в определённой области соответственно если она мотал 4 обмотки я должен их что теперь правильно соединять вот этот трансформатор на самом деле он универсальный смотрите он будет работать не суйся я перед соединяю вот эти допустим вот кидай получаю такую конструкцию снижает частоту и таким образом я когда Беру свой трансформатор Я уже сразу градуирование его по частотам в меня получается F1 чёткая где я его настроил работаю и всё хорошо у меня получается вот она F2 сразу же ж.я. знаю как мне что здесь теперь намотать соответственно Я получаю F3 Но и так далее таким образом намотав правильные геометрические сразу трансформатор Мне большего перематывать не надо я его могу Вот этот трансформатор методом переключение обмоток использовать в этом варианте в этом варианте и вот в этом варианте поэтому я своей трансформаторы когда мотаю я сразу же короче первым делом занимаюсь геометрией То есть я его разрисовываю потом наматываю и дальше после этого дела Просто знаю вот эти частоты Я занимаюсь перед соединением вот такой вот маленький нюанс хитрость то есть которая сделана У нас вот Focus номер один Я вам сегодня довёл до вот Focus номер два я доехал и фокусное натрия вам довёл Поэтому вот в те кто мотают трансформаторы Желаю всем удачи терпения штука требует навыков естественно и всё у вас будет хорошо и всё получится Всем спасибо кто слушал Ну кто хочет послушать следующую так сайт порцию знаний более углубленных которую вы не прочитаете Нигде никогда не вот переходите на мой канал всем счастливо нечётное число нечетное число не делается как правило когда есть зазоры но я их не рекомендую делать потому что там будет сложная геометрия Вот и я просто знаю людей которые этим занимаются поэтому говорю Если не хотите Ну вот эти всяких попадалово Вот почему объясняю сразу Ну что трансформатор можно Ну говорю так вот чисто по-русски поджечь Ну то есть уйти за критическую температуру допустим материала сердечника Да на фильтрах особенно честных это вообще очень легко делается Ну в лупят мощность по-русски говоря глупо но ты он станет неоднородной внутри и вот эта штука Тем более когда три она поплывёт и будет очень плохо поэтому рекомендую работать вот с кратным величинами для средней руки мастера делается всё Элементарно и проблем нет А про вот эти вот 35 объяснять будет сложно потом будет ещё раз говорю массу нюансов бывает иногда так вот честно скажу вот партию куплю партия Да это упаковка вот 18 нормальных 2 неделю Ну то есть просто-напросто а то есть они видно не диктуют их по внутренней да так точно брак заводской как-будто есть их сразу выкидываем всё еда их видно вот сейчас же всё можно хорошо посмотреть увидеть Поэтому такая ситуация делает Как хорошо ток-ток прямые углы вот вроде всё понятно Правильно ли то что используют квадрат который удобнее чем Круг правильно или нет просто логично Мне кажется нелогичным использовать квадратов смотрите как бы есть мы знаем Вот это да где у нас вот допустим от он состоит из двух половинок естественно его делают Иначе как туда обмотку засунуть Да ну проблематично в плане технологическом не хотелось бы да это же другой станок мы понимаем что намотать надо то ли дело на обычном станке тебе намотал вставил Да соответственно у него появится Вот здесь зазоры поэтому Кто делал трансформаторы Вы должны всё это чётко понимать что если вам рекомендуют убрать Здесь всё и максимально сжать то вам практические рекомендуют схему вот такой вот конфигурации магнитного поля внутри То есть это единичное да вот это единичка эквивалент Если у вас есть зазор И тем более вот этот зазор он регулируется и он как правило специальное писан то есть человек который он даёт схемы говорит надо собрать вот так вот так Ну это книжка там справочник Да там какой-то материал настройка Да там-то как правило смотрите будет применяться схема Вот такая то есть изначально будет уже два поля использоваться То есть это как правило трансформатора на высокие частоты там допустим 40 там 80 кг сдаёт вот такого плана то есть там под два кольца и настаивать но есть смешанного типа то есть где части умудряется пройти отсюда через Круг Да вот так а остальная часть ходит вот так вот как я показал то есть смешанный тип то есть половинка ходит Вот так и вторая половинка ходит вот так как это называется кратное трансформаторы Вот это ф хождение вот этой компоненты до вот этой она должна быть кратной А вот этой вот это F1 Вот это F2 вот этой компании и таким образом осуществляется регулировка потока понятно да это сложная система на самом деле это будет 30 40 50 80 нет тут понятия кратность это не так что допустим 1530 это не кратная величина Нет это ни в коем случае не так значит это делается натурными испытаниями то есть в начале загоняется вот в этот режим чётко запекается F2 потом загоняется оптимально опять же на стандартную нагрузку оно не меняется то есть нагрузочную характеристику выбираем точку всё работаю на точке с вот этой характеристикой Да F2 потом не меняя нагрузку работаем cf1 находим оптимальную точку Да всё после этого на село графе у нас с вами ребята есть частота и есть частота то в своде мы убеждаемся что у нас идёт соответствие Вот это и будет называться кратное чистотой но ни в коем случае это не геометрическое не арифметическое сложение и так далее и тому подобное То есть это две нелинейные величины могут быть значит нет это не влияет значит это влияет на что если вы понимаете что у вас используется вот так вот система а этаж легко посмотри да то намотка должна быть правильная вот здесь вот о чём я только что сказал Ни в коем случае вот здесь вот как мы наблюдаем либо Если вы будете мотать вот здесь значит у вас обмотка должна состоять как минимум из двух обмоток вот это вот это будет правильно тогда таким образом можно регулировать фазу если обратную связь говорить Да но это одна из разновидность классических фазосдвигающий в трансформаторов Я про классику здесь не говорю я просто вам говорю вот из того что не написано в учебниках что написано в учебниках вы ребята сами прочитайте и без меня и вот это точка почему образуется вот здесь они вот тут допустим А что объясняю есть кривые трансформаторы Ну точнее как не трансформаторы кольца кривые Ну допустим о чём я говорю вот завод-изготовитель за фарш мочил да Ну извиняюсь конечно за выражение может не литературное Ну да Да не очень качественная у него получилось допустим вот какая-то область до проницаемость 1 а тут получилось чуть-чуть другая соответственно соответственно Да вот эта штука короче может что смещаться вот сюда вы её найдёте Соответственно что вы сделать вы тогда вот эту обмотку смущаете вот сюда то есть вот эту точку А это обмотку смешайте вот сюда и таким образом опять имеем тот же результат понятно и легко находится как бы рабочий точек называется правильно Ну можно обозвать Рабочая Точка Просто я её как-бы обзываю вот ну такой нулевой точкой вот где у меня подходит Да И вот именно по фазовой характеристики мы можем эту точку спокойно туда-сюда наблюдать вот репетировать она как бы нам чётко будет показывать соотношения что мы видим первичной обмотки что едем во вторичной обмотке она может смещаться и ездить это всё абсолютно нормально и это характеристика на регулируемая как правило это делается следующим образом то есть Вот это допустим обмоткой если нам надо эту точку регулировать Да она будет продлена здесь будут сделаны выводы дополнительные и По мере того допустим как только мы будем нагружать нас Трансформатор это точка будет съезжать А мы просто-напросто что переключаемся на вот эти выводы и уходим на вот эти здесь выводы и всё И у нас сохраняются те же вольты амперы просто-напросто да А мы уходим от фазового сдвига Либо наоборот Нам нужен допустим фазовый сдвиг мы соответственно делаем специально смещения и таким образом его получаем это штука обратимая если надо уйти либо она нужна наоборот надо по каким-то причинам вот на её можно таким образом выполнить как правило вот ну переключение это понятно это делают как правило кто Ну кто-то занимается там дома там по я это мы тогда на производстве Ну либо на больших системах это штука она автоматизировано там просто обмотка двигается специально стоят привода и как бы которые двигают эти обмотки и система которая контролирует это всё и соответственно она всё перемещается по команде автоматических устройств которые отслеживают либо поддерживают этот параметр в оптимальном виде там либо в диапазоне Там какой импедансом задали то она в таком диапазоне подъезд

color · December 19, 2021, 02:24:37 AM

Pre-reflective Consciousness Sartre and contemporary philosophy of mind
Edited by Sofia Miguens, Gerhard Preyer, and Clara Bravo Morando
» Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group LONDON AND NEW YORK

Contents
Notes on contributors Preface
Introduction: back to pre-reflectivity SOFIA MIGUENS, GERHARD PREYER, AND CLARA BRAVO MORANDO
PARTI Foundation of the mental
1 Why should we think that self consciousness
is non-reflective? MANFRED FRANK
2 is subjectivity first-personal?
TOMIS KAPITAN
3 Degrees of self-presence: rehabilitating Sartre's accounts
of pre-reflective self-consciousness and reflection KENNETH WILLIFORD
4 Sartre on pre-reflective consciousness: the adverbial
interpretation MARK ROWLANDS
5 Pre-reflective and reflective time-consciousness:
the shortcomings of Sartre and Husserl and a possible way out GERHARD SEEL

First published 2016 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2016 Sofia Miguens, Gerhard Preyer and Clara Bravo Morando, editorial and selection matter, individual chapters, the contributors. The right of the editors to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers, Trademark notice Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Lilrary Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Pre-reflective consciousness : Sartre and contemporary philosophy of mind / edited by Sofia Miguens, Gerhard Preyer and Clara Bravo Morando. -l [edition). pages cm Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Philosophy of mind. 2. Sartre, Jean-Paul, 1905-1980. 3. Consciousness. 4. Subjectivity. I. Miguens, Sofia, editor. BD418.3.P74 2015 1282092—dc23 2015013241
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Contents vii
16 Sartre, enactivism, and the bodily nature of pre-reflective consciousness KATHLEEN WIDER
17 The body is structured like a language:
reading Sartre's Being and Nothingness DOROTHEE LEGRAND
407
18 Basic forms of pre-reflective self-consciousness:
a developmental perspective ANNA CIA UNICA
19 Ego disorders in psychosis: dysfunction of pre-reflective
self-awareness? ANDREAS HEINZ
439
PART V Historical philosophical background
453
20 Radical Epokhè on Sartre's concept of "pure reflection"
RAOUL MOATI
455
21 Sartre and Kierkegaard on consciousness and subjectivity
IKER GARCIA PLAZAOLA
476
22 Invisible ghosts: Les jeux sont faits and disembodied
consciousness JEREMY EKBERG
Index

vi Contents
PART II
I-knowledge, perception, and introspection
6 The zero point and I TERRY HORGAN AND SHAUN NICHOLS
7 A sketch of Sartre's error theory of introspection
MATTHEW C. ESHLEMAN
8 A pebble at the bottom of the water: Sartre and Cavell
on the opacity of self-knowledge PIERRE-JEAN RENAUDIE
9 Does consciousness necessitate self-awareness? Consciousness
and self-awareness in Sartre's The Transcendence of the Ego DANIEL R. RODRÍGUEZ NAVAS
10 Perception and imagination: a Sartrean account
URIAH KRIEGEL
PART III Pre-reflectivity disputed
11 Do we need pre-reflective self-consciousness? About
Sartre and Brentano ERIC TREMAULT
12 Sartre's non egological theory of consciousness
JOSHUA TEPLEY
13 The "of" of intentionality and the "of" of acquaintance
ROCCO J. GENNARO
14 A "quasi-Sartrean" theory of subjective awareness
JOSEPH LEVINE
PART IV Body as a whole, the other, and disorder of the mental
15 Pain: Sartre and Anglo-American philosophy of mind
KATHERINE J. MORRIS

7 A sketch of Sartre's error theory of introspection
Matthew C. Eshleman
We must not make of reflection a mysterious and infallible power, or believe that everything that reflection attains is indubitable because it is attained by reflection.
(Sartre, 2004a, p. 21)
Only a pure reflective consciousness can discover the For-itself reflected-on in its reality
(Sartre, 1956, p. 163)
While it was true in 1987 that "there were] few extended studies of the topic of introspection" (D.S.M. 1987), the same cannot be said today. A growing body of monographs and peer-reviewed articles on all aspects of introspection (e.g., its function, epistemic warrant, ontological status, and the methodological role it might play in the study of consciousness) have burgeoned over the last 15 years or so in both philosophy (e.g., Gertler, 2001, 2003; Schwitzgebel, 2004, 2008; Byrne, 2005; Elshof, 2005; Gallagher and Sørensen, 2006; Hurlbert and Schwitzgebel, 2007; Kriegel and Horgan, 2007; Fernández, 2009, 2013; Reuter, 2010; Smithies and Stoljar, 2012; Butler, 2013; Kriegel, 2013) and psychology (e.g., Jack and Rocpstorff, 2003, 2004; Hatfield, 2005; Price and Murat, 2005; Piccinini, 2009; Jäkel and Schreiber, 2013). This extraordinary revival of analysis and debate over introspection can, of course, be interpreted in numerous ways. As Matthew Boyle (2012) notes, "whether the story of this attraction is that of a doomed obsession from which self-respecting philosophers must break free, or of a comedy of errors that is bound to end in a happy reconciliation—this depends on who gets to tell the tale." These allegories of a "doomed obsession" and a "comedy of errors" parody two ends of a dialectical battlefield and potentially flatten a more complex spectrum of stories that one might tell. The following four interpretations of the introspection renaissance put a little flesh on these bare allegorical bones, and they help to measure the spectrum of positions that frame the aims of this chapter.
First, intransigent local skeptics with an exclusionary alliance to thirdperson method, e.g., behaviorists and logical behaviorists, may argue

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that cognitive science has reached a temporary impasse and that, for a momentary lack of any better ideas, doomed obsessions with introspection have, unfortunately, returned. These local skeptics say: What we need is an absolutely non-introspective approach to cognitive science. Study the brain, study what people do-but don't take people's introspective reports about what they do, perceive, or "think" very seriously. Successful arguments that show such reports are too unreliable and unverifiable to assist in empirical research have been around for a long time: see, e.g, the now classic criti cisms developed by Comte (1830) and the well-known contemporary case made by Nisbett and Wilson (1977). Alas, arguments do not easily cure doomed obsessions: perhaps only therapy will do. Short of that, wayward obsessions shall pass only after cognitive science emerges out of adolescence into maturity, and new generations of philosophers and scientists grow up in a new theoretical climate. One should, at most, enter the argumentative fray to put out smoldering fires. The sooner our doomed obsessions with introspection pass, the better off cognitive science will be
Second, open-minded general skeptics, e.g., Eric Schwitzgebel (2008, 2011; Hurlbert and Schwitzgebel, 2007), may interpret the recent revived interest in introspection as highlighting an apparently insurmountable joint impasse. "If there simply are no better methods, the scientific study of consciousness may prove wholly impossible in principle: vacuous without introspective report, intractably conflictual with it" (Hurlbert and Schwitzgebel, 2007, p. 5). Of course, a lot rides on the perceived lack of any "better methods." A Pyrrhonist skeptic keeps an open mind and does not insist that no such better method shall ever be forthcoming, only that none has been discovered so far. After all, the general skeptic's attitude results from a nonskeptical commitment to the simultaneous unreliability and inescapability of introspection (Schwitzgebel, 2008, p. 246; 2011, p. 118). Consequently, such skeptics live parasitic lives that require optimistic hosts for sustenance. Is this relationship symbiotic? While these skeptics rehearse well-worn challenges to the reliability of introspection, their frequently corrective diag. noses entail that there is (or at least that they still believe there may be) an element of truth delivered by introspection (Schwitzgebel, 2002, 2004). This opens a door to optimism.
Third, hesitant optimists like Uriah Kriegel (2013) cautiously defend introspection and the role it should play in the study of consciousness. True, the current state of affairs is not, in some key areas, particularly satisfactory. Hesitant optimists, nonetheless, interpret the revived interest in introspection as indicating progress, or at least as an initial step in the right direction. While introspection was for a long time scen to be overly unreliable, the cautious optimist argues that we have asked too much of introspection. If we can work towards a "hesitant defense" of "introspective minimalism" (Kriegel 2013), we may be able to pave a way forward--one small step at a time. Cognitive science requires a provisional, practical acceptance of introspection: at least when it comes to certain aspects of our conscious

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experience, it remains entirely unclear how cognitive scientists could even begin to know what to study without first-person reports (Sartre 2012, p. 129; Overgaard 2006, p. 231). So understood, introspection can provide insights in the context of discovery; but we should leave questions of justification to science (Kriegel 2013). Perhaps the best approach to consciousness cautiously sorts through the comedy of errors for a few nuggets of "inner" truth, without which cognitive science cannot progress to its full potential
Fourth, phenomenologists, i.e., contemporary philosophers nurt large measure on a diet of Husserlian thought, and who drawn
thought, and who draw methodological sustenance from later figures in the tradition, sometimes inhabit a fourth category: that of robust optimists (e.g., Lawler, Zahavi, and Gallagher).' They are the least surprised by the current renaissance in studies of introspec tion: after all, it has been, necessarily, just a matter of time. Until cognitive science properly coordinates first-person and third-person methods in the study of consciousness, certain inherent limits shall remain unsurpassable. Unfortunately, mainstream cognitive science, as currently practiced, cannot explicitly recognize the transcendental dimension of conscious experience; hence, it fails to recognize its most distinctive aspect: subjectivity. However, unlike hesitant optimists who accept that descriptive phenomenology can play an important role in the context of discovery, robust optimists maintain that the transcendental structures of consciousness render experience possible; hence, first-person analyses of these structures shall always take logical priority over and ground-every third-person approach.
Faced with these options, which should we choose? This chapter advocates for a version of robust optimism committed to the following two claims: first, the full advance of cognitive science requires coordination between first-person and third-person methods (Chalmers 2010); second, since that coordination is necessary, one's preferred phenomenological method should be compatible with non-reductive attempts to "naturalize" our understanding of pre-reflective conscious experience (Gallagher 2012b). With that said, this chapter makes its case indirectly. Since phe nomenologists claim that we are all naturally bad at introspection, rather than meeting questions of epistemic reliability and operation head on, it sketches a topology of common errors that occur when we reflect upon our own conscious experience. By systematically showing how introspection goes wrong, when attempting to discern the essential structures that make conscious experience possible, I hope to encourage pessimists and hesitant optimists alike that what Sartre calls "pure reflection" can reliably go right.
This would be an overly ambitious task, were it not for the following plausible hypothesis. Most, if not all, introspective errors share a common core: namely that, when we think about our own conscious experience, we frequently try to adopt the perspective of another person. In our efforts to gain objective purchase upon ourselves we attempt to view ourselves as others view us, as if we could adopt a third-person perspective upon our

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own personal experience. Doing so, however, requires standing outside one's own perspective, which is a little like pulling oneself up by one's own bootstraps. Sartre names this bootstrapping kind of effort "accessory" or "impure reflection," which consists in an abortive effort on the part of the for-itself to be another while remaining itself" (1956, p. 161). Otherwise put, impure reflection amounts to the failed effort to stand outside of oneself and adopt a third-person perspective upon one's essentially firstperson experience.
That impure reflection fails to achieve a genuinely third-person perspec tive upon itself should not be especially controversial in today's philosophical climate, at least not for those who accept that pre-reflective conscious experience involves an essentially first-person dimension. Even so, a puzzle remains. Those who recognize the impossibility of taking a third-person perspective on one's own first-person conscious experience, as one experiences it, are faced with the necessity of explaining the alternative: what can it mean to take a first-person perspective on one's own first-person perspec tive? In response to this question, I argue for two claims: first, that such a proposition doesn't mean anything coherent, since doing so is impossible; and, second, that the very attempt to take a "point of view" upon one's own conscious experience motivates many—if not most, or even all-errors made in our introspective efforts to understand consciousness better. To Kant's complaint that philosophers have for too long mixed empirical with transcendental claims, Sartre effectively adds that philosophers almost inevitably muddle the first-person vs third-person distinction when theorizing about (embodied) consciousness.
The rest of this chapter unfolds in five parts and a conclusion. The first part, Why Sartre? makes some general remarks that explain why Sartre motivates this project and it also serves as a programmatic introduction to Sartre's earliest philosophical works. The second part, Basic distinctions, provides a description of being absorbed in reading good fiction as a basis upon which to characterize several standard distinctions accepted by most phenomenologists. The third part, A topological sketch of introspec tive errors, sketches a general error theory that maps the central ways in which our thinking about thinking go wrong. The fourth part, The problem of purifying reflection, raises a challenge to Sartre's pivotal distinction between pure and impure reflection, necessary to showing how reflection can go right, and it offers a defense. The fifth part, An insuperable ambiguity, remarks on an insuperable ambiguity that is constitutive of selfawareness and that can, upon reflection, make self-awareness seem either paradoxical (Woodruff Smith, 1986) or mysterious (Kriegel, 2003).
Why Sartre? The choice of Sartre (instead of Husserl) as the subject of this chapter may seem unfortunate. Sartre rarely discusses methodology in any significant

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detail, his jargon can be impenetrable, and his views on consciousness appear to be highly revisionary and, hence, controversial. Consequently, looking to Sartre for resources to develop an error theory of introspection may seem like a dubious task that needs justification. Six points and an observation comprise this justification and will also serve as a programmatic introduction to Sartre's early philosophical writings.
First, Sartre's texts up to but not including Being and Nothingness read much more like rigorous academic philosophy, and they follow the spirit of Husserl's (1913) phenomenological method very closely. Sartre's incisive analyses based on astute descriptions shine through in these early works, and they sharply contrast his obscure language and hyperbolic claims that appear rather suddenly in Being and Nothingness. Thus, those sympathetic to careful applications of the spirit of Husserl's method, but who are understandably unwilling to suffer through the semantic jungle of Being and Nothingness, will find much more clarity in Sartre's earliest works. Of course, many of the contributions in this volume reinforce this point.
Second, Sartre read a great deal of research psychology from the nine teenth and early twentieth centuries (1936a, 1936b, 1939, 1940), and he was acutely aware of the debates over the epistemic reliability of introspec tion. He offers a rather weaker view of the epistemic reliability of claims derived from purifying reflection. On the one hand, while he holds that pure reflection can achieve apodictic certainty (2004a, pp. 10, 15, 1956, pp. 84, 156), the range of claims for which such certainty holds turns out to be very limited, namely, it holds only for claims about the stream-ofconscious experience (but not its objects) in the instantaneous moment. Yet such claims are sufficient to supply the evidentiary basis for situated, transcendental arguments from which to derive the basic structures of conscious human experience. On the other hand, he emphasizes that all claims about transcendent objects i.e., any intentional object for consciousness that is not essentially part of the stream of consciousness itself, even with regard to how such an object merely seems) cannot be trusted. In fact, if he goes too far in any one direction, it could plausibly be in the direction of unreliability. He includes the empirical ego or psyche in the category of transcendent objects, and, consequently, he maintains that our observations about our own empirical ego-including claims about our character and explanations for our motives, etc.--are, more often than not, mistaken.
Third, whereas Husserl took many transcendental claims to be true in an absolute sense (i.e., necessarily true for any conscious activity whatso ever, whether that of God or a dog). Sartre, at least in his better moments, employs a weaker sense of situated transcendental claims. On the basis of phenomenological descriptions, e.g., of our ability to imagine non-exist ent future states of affairs, Sartre transcendentally deduces various ontological structures that must obtain, as a matter of factual necessity, given

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the truth of those descriptions (see, e.g., Sartre 2004b, pp. 179-188). Insofar as Sartre establishes merely factual necessities, this entails that, for a being which enjoys a categorically different kind of experience, its ontological structures, as transcendentally entailed by those experiences, would, presumably, differ. Needless to say, Sartre's weaker view of situated transcendental claims is more straightforwardly compatible with a nonreductive approach to cognitive science (Gallagher 2012b). In fact, some cognitive scientists have already begun to adopt a similar transcendental method.
Fourth, even though Sartre is highly critical of psychology at the turn of the century, he accepts that a purely descriptive, first-person method needs to be supplemented by empirical research. This point comes out most clearly in the last two-thirds of The Imaginary, where Sartre abandons pure description and draws heavily, albeit critically, upon inductive inferences grounded in studies made by nineteenth-and early-twentieth-century psychologists like Galton, Binet, Messer, Flach, Tain, Leroy, and Spaier.? Sartre's appeal to such studies may be surprising, and while Sartre scholars can debate whether such sympathies were long-lasting, I think this appeal should come as a relief, for it helps to widen slightly the already open door to collaboration between phenomenology and cognitive science. In short, Sartre's early works make a better ally for those interested in a rapprochement between phenomenology and cognitive science than is generally supposed.
Fifth, all of Sartre's early philosophical works include sustained analyses of the various ways in which we go wrong when we reflect and report on our conscious experiences. As Jonathan Webber (2004) observes,
throughout The Imaginary, Sartre is concerned not only to refute this (perception-based) view of the mind, but also to understand the pressures that have pushed theorists in its direction. The acceptability of (Sartre's] alternative model will, at least in part, be a function of how well it dissipates these pressures or can explain why they should be resisted.
(p. xx)
My efforts below aim to sketch what "dissipates these pressures" in a programmatic way that goes beyond The Imaginary but also draws upon Sartre's other early works up to and including Being and Nothingness.
Sixth, despite all of Being and Nothingness' liabilities, in that text Sartre offers several astute analyses of how philosophers frequently mix claims derived from first-person introspection with third-person or quasi-thirdperson perspectives. These analyses provide good explanations for why several classic philosophical problems arise and remain unresolved. To take one relevant example, Sartre argues that the "false problem" of understanding how mind and body interrelate is due to the fact that people have

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wanted to link my consciousness of objects to the body of the Other" (1956, p. 305). Otherwise put, "I try to unite my consciousness not with my body but with the body of others" (1956, p. 303). Perhaps, in an analogous way, contemporary philosophers make a similar kind of mistake when discussing the so-called "mind-brain" and "body-body" problems. They try to unite their first-person conscious experience not with their own lived body, but with a brain that they've never directly experienced but have only studied via anatomy and neurophysiology (i.e., from a third-person perspec tive). These are two fundamentally different orders of description, or so it will be argued. If this criticism is correct, many discussions of the so-called mind-brain, mind-body, and body-body problems ride on a basic confusion between two irreducibly different orders of description.
A final observation: a complete account of Sartre's error theory of introspection would require taking into consideration both its existential and technical aspects. Whereas the existential aspects motivate errors, the technical aspects explain their theoretical shapes. These two dimensions of error can and should be kept separate; indeed, Sartre did not strongly press the motivational aspects of error until Being and Nothingness. Otherwise put, even though in Being and Nothingness Sartre maintains that discomfiting aspects of life motivate many, if not most, theoretical errors, the existential aspects of these errors are generally too controversial to meet any widely acceptable justificatory standard. Thus, Sartre scholars will make better inroads into contemporary debates surrounding the philosophy of mind by emphasizing and explaining the technical aspects or shapes of Sartre's error theory as a propaedeutic to Sartre's account of embodied consciousness.
Basic distinctions Ordinarily we easily distinguish between explicitly self-directed experiences and lived experiences. Examples of engrossment, like reading good fiction, provide paradigmatic examples of the former. As one becomes imaginatively absorbed in the details of a captivating novel, every explicit sense of oneself as reading entirely disappears. One imagines the poplar trees, a blood-stained white coat, the axe grooves in the dirt; one feels trepidation and then horror at the tangled body, suddenly headless ... and then empathy and sorrow for the parent's loss, as if the fictional victim were one's own child. When engrossed, the story becomes the focal aspect of experience, and, correlatively, the contours of one's body along the couch, the faint music from the other room, fade into an increasingly indeterminate, unat tended background. Something similar, but not identical, happens to one's explicit sense of self during engrossment.
In sharp contrast, if someone enters the room and asks, "What are you doing?" attention naturally shifts from the story to one's experience of reading it. Engrossed experience comes to an end and (in response to the

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question) reflection upon one's current conscious activity begins: "I am reading an amazing book about the South at the turn of the century, where a young white girl was raped and gruesomely murdered by an elderly white farmer. An innocent young black teenager was falsely accused and then lynched before the trial ended." Only upon reflection does one's sense of being a discrete agent of an activity, possessing an experience, become explicit. Only then can one make the following kinds of distinctions, organized here in five points.
First, most people, except the self-obsessed, spend considerably more time living life (pre-reflectively) than (reflectively) thinking about the life that one lives. This suggests that explicit self-awareness arises in specific contexts. Five common (but not comprehensive) cases motivate reflection: (1) When environmental anomalies interrupt implicit expectations, e.g. when something goes wrong (like the car won't start or there's no hot water in the shower), this can motivate reflective efforts to understand and integrate such anomalies into our lived experience. (2) When we learn new physical activities (e.g., dancing or sewing) we initially tend to reflect upon what to do while trying to do it, as opposed to spontaneously performing it. (3) When we feel like someone is watching us, we frequently experience explicit self-consciousness. (4) When we puzzle through major life decisions, this tends to motivate reflection over our motives and reasons for various possible choices. (5) Finally, most relevantly, when we theorize about consciousness we tend to reflect upon our pre-reflective conscious experience in our efforts to understand ourselves better.
Second, reflection typically does not discover anything genuinely new (Sartre, 1956, p. 155) about itself qua reflected upon. One does not have an anonymous pre-reflective experience, e.g., "someone is reading" and then infer from (or discover upon the basis of) that anonymous experience that
This suggests that reflection renders implicit aspects of pre-reflective experience explicit. Otherwise put, in reflection we recognize what we pre-reflectively already implicitly comprehend (Sartre, 1956, pp. 155-156), namely that we were enjoying a lived reading experience." It follows, then, that reflective consciousness is not surprised by what it renders explicit (Sartre, 1956, pp. 155-156)-e.g., by the fact that I am reading. More strongly put, if reflection makes explicit what one already implicitly comprehends, reflection never discovers anything genuinely new or surprising about its pre-reflective experience."
Third, prior to reflection, while engrossed, no explicit or genuine positing of oneself (qua agent) as distinct from one's activity (of reading) as distinct from the object (the story) takes place. Insofar as these relations remain implicit, so too do various distinctions that one might make about them. This raises a thorny question about what happens in the process of making implicit aspects of conscious experience explicit (see below). The point here, however, is that one's implicit sense of self-awareness contrasts with explicit, reflective self-awareness in four ways. (A couple of these differences

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require justification that goes beyond description and must be stated here without argument.) Unlike explicit self-awareness that can operate as a kind of voluntary "self-observation," intrinsic self-awareness is (1) non-voluntary, (2) non-observational; (3) non-inferential; and (4) non-intentional. What follows amplifies each of these four points.
Implicit self-awareness is non-voluntary. It takes no effort. It's not some thing that we deliberately will, and it always seems to accompany our prereflective conscious experience. Second, it is non-observational. It does not require second-order, reflective acts to observe and, hence, constitute it. Rather, implicit self-awareness makes "self-observation" in the reflective sense possible (Sartre, 1956, p. lii). Thus, reflective acts do not cause or lead to self-awareness; they merely make implicit self-awareness explicit Third, it's non-inferential, insofar as it is unmcdiated by secondary acts. We generally do not have anonymous experiences and then, on that basis, infer possession of them. Rather, we experience implicit self-awareness as inescapably built into our pre-reflective experience, not as added on. Finally, implicit self-awareness does not require doubling intentionality. Otherwise put, the best theoretical explanation for implicit self-awareness should not posit twofold intentional content, i.e., an inner representation of self and an outer representation of the world. (This last point requires amplification and justification, given below.)
Fourth, we can abstractly distinguish between two dependent parts (or moments) of pre-reflective conscious experience: (1) non-positional selfawareness-what I have been calling "implicit self-awareness, and (2) positional acquaintance with an intentional object. Unlike the non-positional dimension of self-awareness, our positional grasp of intentional objects frequently (not necessarily) includes predication. For example, we prereflectively know that the boy (the subject) in the story is falsely accused of murder (the predicate). In contrast, it will be argued below, our imaginary terror does not, at the pre-reflective level, form an object of experience at all. Rather, it's a constitutive feature of that which illuminates intentional objects as meaningful.
If correct, our account of "what it is like to be acquainted with an object should sharply differ from the kind of account required by our description of the object with which we are acquainted. For example, it is one thing to describe the boy's response to the false accusations (in the novel) and wholly another to describe "what it is like to live imaginatively through the boy's terror at the false accusations (and yet still another to give an account of actual lived terror, e.g., what it is actually like to be falsely accused in a racist context on pain of death). This suggests that we should not straightfor wardly align pre-reflective consciousness with the first-person perspective. Rather, pre-reflective consciousness includes both a first-person dimension (implicit self-awareness of "what it is like to experience an object), and a proto third-person dimension (acquaintance with the intentional object experienced).15

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Fifth, locating the first and third-person dimensions of perspectivity within pre-reflective consciousness indicates an insuperable ambiguity, to be further discussed in the conclusion. Whereas pre-reflective consciousness enjoys implicit self-awareness that does not explicitly posit itself as a subject of experience, in reflecting upon pre-reflective self-consciousness one can simultaneously feel like observer and observed, an observer-observed," so to speak, and this constitutes a truly unique experience. We experience nothing in the world that is at all or in any way like this: nothing else gives rise to this peculiar observer-observed feel. Although the unusual character of this feel motivates philosophers to describe self-awareness as either paradoxical or mysterious, this chapter concludes that the peculiarity of implicit self-awareness made explicit is best characterized as ontologically (and not merely cpistemically) ambiguous.
Finally reflection modifies (but does not necessarily distort) pre-reflective experience. Two qualitative aspects typically characterize this modification: (1) an explicit sense of ownership that the recent and current experiences reflected upon are mine and (2) an explicit sense of agency that I am the source of my activity, e.g., reading. Although reflection can involve the kind of doubling noted above, i.e., the simultaneous observerobserved feel, pure reflection is best characterized as amplifying that about which we are always already implicitly aware. Since that implicit awareness never includes being an object for ourselves, the peculiar observer-observed feel (noted above) amounts to a special kind of illusion (discussed below). Consequently, Sartre adds (3), that there are two kinds of reflection. On the one hand, impure reflection both modifies and distorts (by doubling) that upon which it reflects and, hence, it adds more than evidence serves. On the other hand, purifying reflection merely amplifies or makes explicit what is already implicitly comprehended (prior to reflection).
A topological sketch of introspective errors On the basis of these observations the following preliminary distinctions have been drawn: (1) pre-reflective conscious experience vs non-conscious objects of experience; (2) non-positional vs positional moments of prereflective conscious experience; (3) pre-reflective conscious experience vs reflective conscious experience; (4) implicit self-awareness vs explicit reflective self-awareness; and (5) impure vs pure reflection. These distinctions provide the basis for a nearly comprehensive list, as found in the work of Sartre, of all of the kinds of errors made when we reflect upon conscious experience:!?
(1)
The projection error. Sometimes we illicitly project aspects of reflective consciousness on to pre-reflective consciousness. Sartre does not label this error as such, but he describes it in several places (2004b, pp. 52, 69; 2004a, pp. 10, 14, 17, 27).

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(2) The reification error. Sometimes qualities of objects for consciousness
are applied to conscious experience itself (1956, pp. 103, 163, 206; 1967, p. 127). Since the primary objects for conscious experience are most frequently material objects, this misleads us into attributing predicates suitable for material objects to our conscious experience.
(Sartre most commonly calls this error bad faith.) (3) The illusion of immanence: A subspecies of the reification error leads us
mistakenly to attribute spatial qualities to consciousness, as if it were like a receptacle that contains ideas, representations, and psychic objects (2004b, pp.5, 53, 87, 138). The warping of thought: Sometimes when we think we are describing some aspect of conscious experience we surreptitiously introduce claims based on subtle but misleading analogies; Sartre calls this the warping of thought (2004b, pp. 116-117). The illusion of the primacy of knowledge: Sometimes we confuse claims produced by positional observations for aspects of non-positional self-awareness (1956, p. liv). This leads us mistakenly to characterize pre-cognitive aspects of experience as cognitive (1956, p.x). The standpoint error: Most of the time when we reflect upon our conscious experience, in our effort to gain objective purchase upon our selves, we try to take a point of view" upon our viewpoint (1956, pp. 43, 155, 161). We attempt to adopt pseudo third-person perspec tive on our essentially first-person experience.
(6)
The projection error involves a confusion of the essential struc reflective acts with those of unreflective acts" (2004a, p. 17). Descartes' cogito offers the most famous instance of the projection error. In charac terizing Descartes' mistake, Sartre follows Husserl and distinguishes prereflective doubt from reflective doubt. Whereas pre-reflective doubt occurs spontaneously (e.g., when one suddenly doubts that a coil of rope in the shadows is what it seems to be, namely a snake), reflective doubt occurs deliberately (e.g., in the application of a method of inquiry). Thus, prereflective doubt only concerns intentional objects it cannot doubt its own
e due to its essential object orientation whereas reflective doubt attempts, but necessarily fails, to doubt its existence. So understood, when Descartes arrives at his famous observation every time I am thinking, I exist (1637, Discourse IV)—he does so via reflective doubt that renders implicit self-awareness explicit.18
In arriving at the cogito, Descartes makes two separate (but related) errors. Descartes mistakenly concludes (1) that the "T" resides at the level of pre reflective consciousness (the projection error) and (2) that thinking is an attribute of a non-extended substance (a conceptual variation of the reification error). With regards to (2), Descartes hypostasizes selfawareness into an ego substance, qua source of thought, and then pro jects it into pre-reflective consciousness. In this way, Descartes confuses

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pre-reflective consciousness, which does the thinking, with the reflective level of consciousness, which constitutes the ego. Otherwise put, "the (reflective) consciousness that says 'I think' is precisely not the (pre-reflecLive] consciousness that thinks" (2004a, p. 10).
This analysis motivates Sartre's observation that "the reason why Descartes moved from the Cogito to the idea of thinking substance is that he believed that the I and think' are on the same level" (2004a, p. 14/34). In projecting a reified ego into the heart of consciousness, Descartes characterizes thought as an attribute of a non-extended substance and, in so doing, unnecessarily multiplies theoretical entities. Sartre's parsimonious alternative shows why the introduction of any sort of thinker/thought, subject/ object, or substance/attribute distinction into pre-reflective consciousness not only generates unnecessary theoretical complexity, but also that it tends to leave the structure of implicit self-awareness unexplained. Sartre reaches his minimalist view on both descriptive and argumentative grounds.
On descriptive grounds: when we reflect on pre-reflective consciousness, in a purifying way, we don't find anything in or behind conscious experience, Otherwise put, Sartre's account parallel's G. E. Moore's (1903) account of consciousness as diaphanous. As Kenneth Williford helpfully puts it,
consciousness is phenomenologically diaphanous: one is aware of the objects and their qualities; there seems to be nothing literally in con sciousness or behind it, and nothing between it and its objects. Still, it is distinguishable. The consciousness of an object is not (typically) the object of that consciousness.
(Williford, 2004, p. 149)
This way of putting matters suggests that Hume rightly saw that the kind of self putatively discovered" and frequently posited to account for personal unity amounts to an illusion (based on reification). However, in pointing out this illusion, Hume was looking for the self in the wrong place" (Woodruff Smith, 1986, p. 149). From the fact that Hume could not discover a self in introspection, Hume mistakenly supposed that the self must be part of the content of experience. What Hume plausibly failed to appreciate is that self-awareness is built into pre-reflective conscious experience in such a way that it does not-even cannot represent itself to itself. (An argum this claim returns below.)
To be sure, reflection upon implicit self-awareness often generates a curious switching phenomenon. Like the well-known duck-rabbit optical illusion that sometimes looks like a duck and sometimes looks like a rabbit, yet cannot look simultaneously like both, a similar shifting can arise when we reflect upon conscious experience. When grasped reflectively, it can appear either diaphanously (and seem like nothing) or opaquely (and seem like something). This switching phenomenon forms two horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, like Descartes, in making itself into an observed object,

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consciousness arguably reifies itself into something that it is not. For in rep resenting itself as an object, it cannot grasp itself as a subject. On the other hand, sometimes, like Hume, when you go looking for yourself, while you may never find yourself, you cannot escape the fact that conscious experience always ineluctably feels like it is your own. Call this Hume's dilemma. It returns in the conclusion.
The reification error includes a subspecies of error that Sartre labels "the illusion of immanence." This illusion results from "our habit of thinking in space and in terms of space" (2004b, p. 5), and this habit misleads us to "constitute the world of the mind from objects very similar to those of the external world and which, simply, obey different laws" (2004b, p. 6). Doing so motivates mistakenly locating ideas or thoughts inside of conscious activity (or, analogously, of locating consciousness inside of a body). There is, however, nothing literally inside of consciousness (and consciousness does not stand "inside of its body). If correct, the Latin roots of "introspection" mislead us into thinking that when we think about thought this literally involves looking inside of our minds. Words with spatial meanings, however, are, at best, misleading colloquial metaphors-more the province of philologists than phenomenologists.
Sartre gives a broad explanation for all three of these errors that characterizes how we arrive at pensée spatialisée. Sartre calls this "the warping of thought" and he claims that it is one of the most frequent causes of error, particularly in psychology and philosophy" (2004b, p. 117). Warping occurs on the basis of illicitly introducing subtle analogical reasoning where one believes oneself to be giving a purely descriptive account. To put this matter in overly simplistic terms, the surreptitious analogy moves from either spatial qualities or quasi-spatial qualities, e.g., of imaginary objects or representations of spatial schema, and then attributes them to acts of consciousness themselves. In this way, via implicit analogical reasoning, one attributes spatial qualities to non-spatial thoughts and then to the activity of thinking itself.23
While the first four kinds of errors all relate to our natural proclivity to construe self-conscious experience in objectified, spatialized terms (a strategy Sartre adapts from Bergson), the illusion of the primacy of knowledge stands, on the surface, in a different category, and it is more difficult to unpack in its details. Most broadly put, this illusion results either when we construe our most basic relationships (to ourselves, the world, and others) in entirely cognitive terms (in the sense of being inherently conceptual, e.g., in the Kantian sense that all intelligible experience is already schematized) or, more broadly, when we suppose that epistemology should take theoreti cal primacy over ontology (as most modern philosophy does). The latter broader supposition cannot be fully discussed here for reasons of brevity.
Sartre addresses the narrower portion of this error in the context of making an argument that the necessary and sufficient condition for a knowing consciousness to be knowledge of its object, is that it be consciousness of

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itself as being that knowledge" (1956, p. lii). Sartre proceeds by way of a two-pronged dilemma. On the one hand, if there were no self-consciousness of knowing X, then it would be a consciousness unconscious of itself, which, Sartre claims, is contradictory. On the other, less controversial, hand, if one construes the relation constitutive of intrinsic self-awareness as involving a known-known dyad, an infinite regress results: the knower that knows needs another knower to know the first knower knowing ... Sartre concludes that, in order to avoid this infinite regress, the transcendental ground for our knowing X requires "a non-cognitive relation of the self to itself" (1956, p. liin).
This means, according to Sartre, that self-awareness does not posit itself as an intentional object. Consequently, no concepts can be attached to it, insofar as there is no subject to attach predicates (1956, p. 354). In this sense, its grasp of itself is non-cognitive or, perhaps better put, pre-conceptual. So understood, implicit self-awareness is necessary to know objects but it does not know itself knowing them.26 Another way to come at the non-cognitive dimension of conscious experience is to note that many of its constitutive components are not intentional objects. Like intrinsic self-awareness that does not represent itself to itself qua intentional object; neither do any other of these non-positional aspects of conscious experience, and, thus, they function pre-predicatively. 27
To help to clarify this matter, Sartre offers a few astute phenomenological descriptions: living through thirst (1956, pp. 82, 87), pain (1956, pp. 330-332), and fatigue (1956, pp. 453-459). Take the example of pain. When reading for a very long period of time the words may begin to tremble and quiver, as their meanings become increasingly difficult to comprehend (1956, pp. 332-333). At the pre-reflective level, it's the story that comprises the intentional correlate of painful reading, where pain is neither a thematic object represented in the content of experience nor something in addition to one's eyes. Rather, one's eyes exist in a painful way constitutive of the pre-reflective troubled-reading experience. We can, of course, turn our attention away from the story and reflect upon the pain and locate it in our eyes, but Sartre notes that doing so transforms pain into an object (1956, p. 355).
Although the act of objectification doesn't necessarily falsify pain, where it should be admitted that Sartre isn't especially clear on what distinguishes successful from unsuccessful objectifications, doing so requires introducing a third-person viewpoint and requires that we abandon our lived experience (see below). In reflecting upon pain in an objectifying way we adopt a position similar to how an ophthalmologist might examine and diagnose it. Thus, we shift the locus of experience away from the original intentional correlate (the increasingly unintelligible story) to an aspect constitutive of the experiential side, namely my painful eyes. In the process, we can overlock what lived pain is like in deference to objectified pain or mix claims about the two orders of description together.

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That lived "pain is notoriously difficult to describe" (Gallagher and Nikolic, 2012, p. 139) does not result solely from the fact that painful experience is so specific to the individual, that our concepts are insufficiently fine-grained. Rather, pain is a constitutive feature of the non-cognitive dimension of our pre-reflective experience and comprises a pre-linguistic horizon that defies well-formed definitions. This explains why, in our best efforts to describe lived pain, we frequently employ metaphor, poetic alle gory, and analogy. To think that one can give well-formed definitions is to succumb to the illusion of the primacy of knowledge.
This brings us to the crux of the matter. The reflective effort to take a position upon non-positional aspects of our conscious experience frequently involves the standpoint error. Due to its importance and complex ity, this error will be approached in two stages. The first stage discusses embodiment, where it is easier to mark out the first/third-person distinc tion. The second stage addresses the issue of reflective consciousness, where the first/third-person distinction becomes murkier. The analogy from the case of embodiment to consciousness only goes so far, for reasons that should become clear below.
Stage one
As seen above, Sartre argues that the "false problem" of understanding how the mind and body interrelate results from the fact that people have wanted to link my consciousness of objects to the body of the Other" (1956, p. 305). It's easy to see how this can arise in the case of my body: I can straightforwardly look at my body as Others see it, e.g., by looking at it in a mirror. When I look at my body in a mirror, however, I'm not experiencing it qua lived. As Sartre puts it, "either (the body) is a thing among things, or else it is that by which things are revealed to me. But it cannot be both at the same time" (1956, p. 304).
Sartre reaches this asymmetry by way of a now familiar analogy tied to a transcendental argument. Here's the analogy: just as the eye cannot see itself qua seeing, we cannot know our body qua living it (1956, pp. 304-305, see also p. 316). Although I can look at my eyeball in a mirror, doing so does not capture the "what it's like aspect of seeing; rather, it captures the eyeball as an object seen. So when we look our body in a mirror, qua thirdperson perspective, we abandon our first-person, lived perspective (1956, p. 318). Otherwise put, our inhabited viewpoint vanishes as soon as we try to take an exterior viewpoint upon it.
Thus, in a way similar to non-positional dimensions of conscious experience, Sartre argues that "the body is lived but not known" (1956, pp. 324, see especially pp. 354–855). Our lived body is not, first and fore. most, an intentional object of experience; thus, it is not an object sub ject to predicates qua lived. For example, while absorbed in typing, I do not apprehend my hands. Rather, the words and sentences unfold on the screen as to-be-finished within an affective horizon of urgency: late again

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to meet a deadline. When understood in this lived way, my body isn't something in addition to or over and above my self-conscious experience of typing. So understood, my lived body is not a contingent feature added on to consciousness; rather, "it is the permanent structure of my being and the permanent condition for the possibility of my consciousness as consciousness of the world" (1956, p. 328, translation slightly altered). Qua lived, embodiment supplies a necessary condition for the possibil ity of having the kind of practical, spatially oriented experiences that we enjoy; hence, it conditions the range and meanings of our lived experience (1956, p. 328).
Stage two
Unlike the case of our bodies, the case of pre-reflective consciousness turns out to be only roughly analogous. Sartre argues that we cannot ever take a genuinely third-person perspective upon it. We cannot look at our conscious experience, as we do our bodies, in a mirror, as it were. Although Sartre employs an array of optical terms, e.g., reflection, reflecting, reflected, that can make it seem like reflective consciousness can take some kind of per spective on itself, Sartre denies that any non-distorting reflection can take a perspective upon itself.
He puts the matter like this: Reflective consciousness cannot "detach itself completely from the reflected-on, and (hence] it cannot grasp the reflected-on from a point of view" (1956, p. 155). Sartre's analysis contin. ues as follows:
Actually the consciousness reflected-on is not presented" yet as something outside reflection, that is, as a being on which one can take a point of view, in relation to which one can realize a withdrawal, increase or diminish the distance which separates one from it.
(1956, p. 155)
Reflection and reflected being one and the same entails that reflection cannot stand outside of itself in order to take a viewpoint on itself. It would be something like standing outside of one's body in order to see it seeing, which is impossible, if not conceptually, then factually. Otherwise put, reflection cannot detach itself from itself (qua reflected upon) and take a position independent of itself. It is itself what it tries to grasp in the very activity of grasping. Now, what Sartre says next is very interesting
In order for the consciousness reflected on to be "viewed from without" and in order for reflection to be able to orient itself in relation to it, it would be necessary that the reflective should not be the reflectedon in the mode of not being what it is not this scissiparity will be realized only in existence for others.
(1956, p. 155)

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In our failure to stand reflectively outside of ourselves, we resort to intro ducing the separation experienced with regard to others. This allows us to approximate a quasi-third-person perspective upon ourselves and leads us to reify consciousness and constitute it in terms of psychic objects. This is impure reflection, i.e., bad faith.
Here arises a serious problem. If we cannot reflectively take a perspective on our inhabited perspective, i.e., if we cannot grasp implicit self-awareness as an intentional object, without abandoning that perspective, then what does purifying reflection grasp in a non-distorting way? Kathleen Wider (1997) raises this worry and argues that Sartre has no satisfactory answer. It will be helpful, then, to answer this question by way of responding to Wider's worry
The problem of purifying reflection
Wider argues that Sartre fails to distinguish adequately pure reflection from pre-reflective consciousness "without at the same time destroying the distinction he draws between pure and impure reflection" (Wider, 1997, p. 80), Wider poses her worry as a twofold dilemma. On the one hand, if pure reflection grasps itself qua object, then pure reflection does not differ from impure reflection. On the other hand, if pure reflection does not grasp itself in as an object, then it becomes indistinguishable from the actual selfconsciousness of pre-reflective consciousness" (Wider, 1997, p. 81). Wider diagnoses this problem in epistemic terms. "(Sartre) fails to develop a the. ory of consciousness's non-cognitive presence to itself that allows him to
tinguish when this self-presence is reflective from when it is not" (Wider, 1997, p. 92). The reason for this is that Sartre doesn't have a "clear enough notion of a knowledge that isn't a subject object relation' (Wider, 1997, p. 85). So, if purifying reflection cannot grasp itself in any non-object-like way, and if Sartre gives us no clear account of epistemic relations that do not invoke a subject/object form, then the explicit self-awareness of pure reflection seems to no different than implicit self-awareness. So in his effort to avoid the error of multiplying theoretical entities, he has multiplied empty conceptual distinctions.
Sartre's entire position hangs in the balance. If impure reflection necessarily distorts what it grasps, Sartre needs a clear account of a nondistorting kind of reflection that is tied to an epistemic framework that does not employ a subject-object form. Unfortunately, Sartre says very little about pure reflection; thus some of what follows must be reconstructive, if not somewhat speculative. To complicate matters, as Wider notes, Sartre equivocates in his epistemic language at a crucial juncture. In a context unspecified in terms of whether it's pure or impure reflection, Sartre claims that reflection achieves knowledge of itself qua reflected upon (1956, p. 151). Here the context concerns the certainty of my existence. A few pages later, however, he claims that reflection does not

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achieve knowledge but rather that it amounts to a form of recognition (1956, p. 156).
These two claims that seem to be at odds with one another can be straightforwardly reconciled. It would have helped had Sartre clarified his epistemic claims in the following way: reflection achieves apodictic knowledge that it exists but this knowledge does not extend to what it is. Indeed, the context of the second passage bears this out: it concerns reti to understand its nature, as opposed to the mere fact of its existence. Once more, when Sartre claims that reflection achieves recognition, this makes good sense, since, as seen above, reflection merely makes explicit what it already implicitly grasps. Hence, it achieves some kind of re-cognition.
Putting matters this way is fine, so far as it goes, but Wider rightly wonders how this re-cognized form of self-awareness differs from implicit selfawareness. What does making self-awareness explicit amount to in epistemic terms? If it's not self-knowledge, then what is it? The spirit of Sartre's answer goes like this: the non-cognitive, non-positional dimension of experience should not be construed in terms of knowledge but in terms of (pre-judicative) comprehension (see, e.g., 1956, pp. 7, 17, 66, and 289). Thus, what pure reflection delivers must be an amplification that makes implicit, prejudicative comprehension explicit, a point that returns below.
It is somewhat surprising that Wider, who reads texts very closely, misun. derstands the centrality of Sartre's distinction between comprehension and knowledge, since comprehension employs the very epistemology that Wider finds lacking. After all, Sartre almost always employs the term prejudicative comprehension and comprehension simpliciter) in contexts that involve putatively objectless epistemic relations, e.g., when we enjoy lived experiences of nothingness (1956, p. 17), contingency (1956, p. 80), non-existent future possibilities (1956, p. 100), being for itself (1956, p. 147), freedom (1956, p. 439), and, most relevantly, "being myself" (1956, p. 289).2 Since there is strictly speaking, no extant "object" in any of these cases but only absences or non-beings, there is no positive thing or being to predicate straightforwardly and, hence, know. So what then does one comprehend when it comes to oneself?
In answer to this question Sartre's clearest example concerns the experience of shame, which
encloses within it an implicit and non-thematized comprehension of being able-to-be-an-object on the part of the subject for whom I am an object. This implicit comprehension is nothing other than the consciousness (of) my "being myself"; that is, of my selfness reinforced.
(1956, p. 289)
This passage does not describe an impure grasp of oneself as an object. Rather it describes an implicit comprehension of the possibility of my being objectified by others.

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This implicit recognition can, however, formally be made an explicit judgment via pure reflection. I can explicitly realize the ever-present possibility of social objectifications, e.g., pressures to conform to social roles that I must live but, ultimately, cannot know. Since this judgment concerns a possibility and possibilities do not, strictly speaking, exist in Sartre's technical sense, comprehension of this non-existent fact does not involve a subject-object relation. Sartre's point is not simply that I cannot know myself as others grasp me (1956, p. 242), but also that I cannot but live these objectifications by freely interiorizing them into my projects (1956, p. 467).
If correct, one thing pure reflection makes explicit concerns the ineliminable social dimension of my sense of being myself." In fact, according to Sartre, it could not be otherwise, because "I cannot confer on myself any quality without mediation or an objectifying power which is not my own" (1956, p. 274). Consequently, the Other is the necessary condition of all thought which I would attempt to form concerning myself" (1956, p. 271, see also p. 236). Unfortunately, it would take this discussion too far afield to develop the details that undergird Sartre's transcendental deduction for the social dimension of self-comprehension. Fortunately, this point conveniently sets up my initial thesis in a programmatic way: all introspective errors involue attempts to take a third-person perspective upon oneself. In short, because social relations necessarily mediate all thoughts that I form concerning myself, it's a natural, nearly inevitable fact that I try and take a third-person perspective upon myself—I try to see myself as I see others or as others see me.
So what then does pure reflection comprehend? It turns out not to be very much, where just a little makes a considerable difference (Sartre, 1956, p. 159). Pure reflection merely makes explicit or amplifies that which we already tacitly comprehend: the interminably fleeting tempo ral flux of our experience, our implicit self-awareness, intentionality, etc. Although when we impurely reflect upon ourselves we feel like we grasp ourselves qua observed, pure reflection cannot represent itself to itself qua observed. Thus, pure reflection merely amplifies our sense of the organized activity of being self-consciously engaged in the world. It does so without giving an accurate representation of ourselves qua observed: no such representation is possible (Sartre, 1956, pp. 241, 270). Introspection, then, should not be understood as self-observation but rather as an amplification of self-awareness and other non-positional aspects of our experience, without shifting them into the third-person position. On my reading, then, it is upon the basis of veridical descriptions of purified experience that we can, according to Sartre, transcendentally deduce the necessary ontological structures that make those experiences possible. It may not be much, but if implicit self-awareness makes reflection possible, without pure reflection the basic distinctions required by the philosophy of mind would be impossible.

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An insuperable ambiguity Earlier it was claimed that implicit self-awareness simultaneously seems to be everywhere and somehow nowhere. We cannot escape self-awareness, we cannot representationally grasp it as an object, and we cannot discover it in the content of any experience. This truly puzzling phenomenon constitutes Hume's dilemma. It is this evanescence of self-awareness that arguably moors philosophers upon either the Charybdis of paradox (Rosenberg, 1981; Woodruff Smith, 1986) or the Scylla of mystery (Kriegel, 2003, p. 178). Self-awareness can seem paradoxical in the sense that when we try to grasp ourselves (qua observers) we seem to transform ourselves into something we are not (observed subjects). Thus, the very self-awareness that makes introspection of oneself possible also makes oneself simultaneously inapprehensible.
Alternatively, as Kriegel (2003) suggests, our account of self-awareness might require collapsing the gap between ourselves understood as subjects (observers) and objects (observed). For it can seem as if the self is represented both as subject and object." Kriegel admits that "one may protest that this would make self-awareness quite mysterious, and will attribute to it a unique intentional structure. But then self-awareness is quite mysterious, isn't it, and its intentional structure is indeed

color · December 19, 2021, 02:32:43 AM

사르트르 만큼 오류많은 철학자도 드물다.
프랑스 철학자들은 나폴레옹 절대정신에 집착하는 자들이라 헤겔(독일)이 나쁜놈이다.
사르트르도 메타버스 유사개념 배설한 것 말고 특별한 것은 없다.
사르트르 자유정신 어쩌구 하는 것도 헤겔 절대정신 예하다.
절대정신 세계화가 개인주의다.

γνῶθι σεαυτόν( 그노티 세아우톤 )
너 자신을 알라.
ὁ δὲ ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ
검토되지 않은 삶은 살 가치가 없다.

자신(자아)만이 절대가 너 자신 소크라테스 아니든.

소크라테스에 대한 공식 고발내용
1. 아테네가 믿는 신을 믿지 않았으며
2. 아테네의 청년들을 타락 시켰다.
-고발인 시인 멜제토스, 민중파 영수 아뉘토스, 정치가 뤼콘-

소크라테스가 생각한 비공식 고발내용(당대 악소문)
1. 하늘에 높이 있는 것들을 골똘히 생각하는 자이며 지하의 온갖 것들을 탐사하는 자(=자연철학자)
2. 한결 약한 주장을 더 강한 주장으로 만드는자(=소피스트)
<플라톤, 변론>

소크라테스는
1. 국가가 인정하는 신을 신봉하지 않고,
2. 새로운 신격을 수입한 죄를 짓고 있다. 또,
3. 청년들을 부패시킨 죄도 짓고 있다.
<크세노폰, 회상>

당대에 소크라테스가 직접 점을 치고, 아테네 공공의 제단에서 직접 제사를 지내고, "신령(daimonion)이 당신에게 신탁을 내린다." 라고 말한 사실 때문에 아테네에서 널리 화자되고 있었다고 크세노폰은 증언한다.

그리스는 번개신 제우스가 공식인데,
소크라테스는 신령(daimonion)을 섬긴다.
소크라테스가 섬긴 신이 데몬이다.
철학자가 신을 섬겼다니 좀 이상 얘기 같지만,
옛날 철학자는 요즘의 무당과 같다.
고대인들 하찮은 개인의 생각을 타인에게 관철시키기 위해서는 특별한 장치가 필요했는데 이것이 신의 소환이고, 국가가 인정하는 신이 있었고 요즘 무당들처럼 온갖 잡신들 중에 무당철학사조에 영향을 준 신이 소크라테스에게 있어서는 데몬이란 뜻이다.

1. 고대 그리스에서의 "데몬" : "좋은 데몬"

고대 그리스어 daimon(δαίμων)은 긍정적인 뉘앙스를 가지고 있는 "나눠주다, 나누다"라는 뜻의 동사 daiomai(δαίομαι)에서 파생된 단어입니다.
고대 그리스에서 "데몬"들은 수호신이나 천사와 같이 신성한 능력을 가진 존재로 여겨졌습니다. 그들은 인간들을 지켜주는 존재로 여겨졌는데, "데몬"은 눈에 보이는 것이 아닌 인간들이 느끼는 존재로 이해되었기 때문에 그리스의 예술이나 신화에서 그 모습을 찾기는 쉽지 않습니다.
고대 그리스에서 "데몬"은 크게 두가지 유형으로 나뉘는데, 그 중 하나는 그리스 신화에 나오는 피리를 부는 목양신(牧羊神) "판(Pan)"처럼 장난꾸기 유형입니다. 마치 "알라딘의 요술램프"에 나오는 "지니(Genies)"와 비슷한데, 이렇게 썩 좋지만은 않은 "데몬"들을 "카코다이몬(Kakodaimon, κᾰκόςαίμων)"이라고 부릅니다. "카코다이몬"의 예로 "밤의 여신"인 "닉스(Nyx)"와 판도라가 상자를 열어 세상에 나온 "에레부스(Erebus, 그림자)"와의 사이에서 태어난 딸 "케레스(Keres)"를 들 수 있습니다.
다른 하나는 "법(法)"이나 "격언(格言)"처럼 인간들이 살아가는데 있어서의 규칙과 같은 신성한 것들을 말합니다. 예를 들어, 데몬 "노모스(νόμος, 규범)"가 데몬 "에우세비아(Εὐσέβῐα, 경건함)"와 결혼하여 데몬 "디케(Δίκη, 정의)"를 낳았다는 식입니다. 이런 좋은 데몬들은 "에우다이몬(Eudaimon, Εὐδαίμων)" 또는 "아가토다이몬(Agathodaimon, ἀγαθοδαίμων)"이라고 불렀습니다.

2. "데몬"과 고대 철학자들

"데몬"에 대한 관념은 고대 그리스에서 처음 나타났습니다. 특히, 우리는 그것을 고대 그리스의 철학자이자 수학자이며, 소크라테스의 제자였던 플라톤의 작품들을 통해 확인할 수 있습니다. 플라톤의 역작 "향연(饗宴, symposion)"에서 여류 철학자 디오티마(Diotima)는 소크라테스에게 "사랑(즉, 에로스)"이란 "위대한 데몬"이라고 가르치고 있습니다. 디오티마는 소크라테스에게 "데몬"을 다음과 같이 묘사하고 있습니다.
"데몬적인 모든 것은 신성한 것과 죽음의 사이에 있다. 인간사(人間事)를 해석해서 그것들을 신들에게 전달하고, 신들의 것들을 인간에게 전달하는 역할을 한다. 즉 아래(인간)에서부터의 탄원(歎願)과 희생, 위(신)로부터의 법과 답례 같은 것들을 말이지..."
다시말하면, "데몬"은 천상과 지상 사이에 존재하면서 인간과 신들 사이에 중개자 역할을 하는 신성한 능력을 가진 "반신(半神)"이라는 것입니다.
플라톤의 "소크라테스의 변명(Apology)"에서 소크라테스는 자기 자신만의 "데몬"을 가지고 있다고 말했습니다. 소크라테스는 그가 실수하려고 할 때나, 나쁜 판단이나 위험한 판단을 하려고 할 때, 오직 "데몬"만이 신들의 경고를 일종의 "목소리"를 통해 자신에게 전달해줬다고 말했습니다. "일리아드"와 "오디세이"라는 2개의 대서사시로 우리에게 잘 알려진 기원전 8세기경 고대 그리스의 시인 호메로스는 신(神)과 "데몬"을 비슷하지만 구별해야할 존재라고 이야기한 바 있습니다.
로마 제국에 살았던 알제리 출신의 작가인 "마다우루스의 아풀레이우스(Apuleius of Madaurus)"는 아테네에서 플라톤 철학을 공부한 바 있는데, 그는 그의 저서 "황금당나귀(또는 변형담)에서 "데몬들은 신계(神界)의 중개(仲介) 권력들이다. 그들은 꿈에 나타나 예언을 하는 존재들이다."라고 언급한 바 있습니다.
로마제국 초기에 우상(偶像)들은 이교도들이나 기독교인들에게 공통적으로 관찰할 수 있는데, 그 안에 "신들"이나 "데몬"들의 영혼이 기거하는 것으로 여겨져 음식을 공양하고, 옷을 입혔으며, 종교적인 행사에서는 퍼레이드에 동원되고, 숭배되었습니다. 그러한 우상(偶像)은 고대 그리스의 조각가 페이디아스(Pheidias)에 의해 문명, 지혜, 전쟁의 여신인 파르테논의 아테나처럼 만들어지기도 하였습니다.
그때까지는 그럭저럭 괜찮았습니다. "데몬"들은 여전히 사랑받고, 숭배되고, 수호천사로 여겨졌으며, 착하고 복된 영혼을 가진 것으로 인식되고 있었습니다.

3. "데몬"은 왜 사악한 존재가 되었는가?

이렇게 유쾌하고, 장난꾸러기 같고 때로는 수호천사같은 "데몬"들이 왜 초자연적이고, 사악하고, 깨끗하지 못한 영혼을 가진 타락천사같은 이미지를 가지게 되었을까요?
그러한 이미지를 만드는데 결정적 역할을 한 것은 아브라함 종교(Abrahamic Religions)라 불리는 세 종교, 유대교, 기독교, 이슬람교였으며, 그 중에서 특히 기독교가 큰 역할을 하였습니다. 아브라함 종교들은 "데몬"을 우상화(偶像化)하였으며, "데몬"을 숭배하는 것을 "우상숭배"라고 불렀습니다. 인간들이 만든 동상(銅像)이나 모상(模像)들은 신성한 힘도, 영혼도 없는 것이며 더 이상 아름다운 것으로 여겨지지도 않았습니다.
"그들의 땅은 우상으로 가득합니다. 그들은 자기들 손으로 만든 작품에 자기들 손가락으로 만든 것에 경배합니다." (이사야서 제2장 제8절)
위 내용은 기원전 8세기경 유대인 예언가 이사야가 언급한 것으로 구약(舊約)성경에는 그의 이름을 딴 이사야서가 있습니다.
다마스커스에 가는 길에 예수의 출현(ephiphany)을 경험한 후, 유대교에서 기독교로 개종한 "사도 바울" 또는 "타르수스의 사울"은 그리스와 로마 역사에서의 "데몬"들을 사악한 존재들이라 여겼고, 개종한 기독교인들이 해야할 첫 번째 일이 이러한 사악한 존재들(데몬들)을 숭배하는 것을 멈추는 것이라 주장했습니다. 이후, 로마제국 말기에는 "데몬"들이 인간의 형체를 띠면서 역병(疫病)이나 폭동을 일으키는 존재로 인식되었습니다.

4. 번역상 오류

"데몬"이라는 용어는 히브리 성경을 번역한 그리스 구약성경 70인역(Septuagint Bible)을 통해 그 부정적인 이미지가 강해졌습니다. 그리스어 "데몬"은 영어에서 devil(악마)에 해당하는 그리스어 "디아볼로스(Diabolos, 디아블로)"로 번역되었습니다. 이것은 말 그대로 번역상 오류(Lost in translation)로, 신약성경이 그리스어에서 번역될 때나, 구약성경이 히브리어나 아람어(Aramic)에서 번역될 때, 그리스어와 라틴어로 외경(外經)이 번역될 때, 그리고 1611년에 "킹 제임스 성경(The King James Bible)"으로 번역될 때도 이 오역(誤譯)은 그대로 이어졌습니다.

5. 아우구스티누스의 "데몬"에 대한 견해

신학자이자 철학자이며 서방기독교에서 가장 중요한 교부(敎父)로 여겨지고 있는 "히포의 아우구스티누스(Sanctus Aurelius Augustinus Hipponensis)"는 "데몬"들을 인간을 지배하고, 환상을 일으키는 순전히 심리적인 것으로 이해했습니다.
흔히 그렇듯이, 기독교 교부(敎父)들은 비기독교 고대 작가들을 연구하는 매니아들이었습니다. 그리고 그들의 작품들을 비하하면서(poopooing) 그것들을 이단(異端)이라고 선언하곤 했습니다. 히포의 아우구스티누스(Sanctus Aurelius Augustinus Hipponensis)도 다르지 않았습니다. 아우구스티누스가 방종에 대한 속죄로서의 기도를 통해 "빛을 보기(Saw the light)" 이전에 그의 삶을 그린 작품 "고백록(Confessions)"을 저술한 이후, 그는 아프리카의 작가 "마다우루스의 아풀레이우스(Apuleius of Madaurus)"의 작품들을 조롱하기 시작했습니다.
아우구스티누스는 그의 또 다른 저서, "신국론(神國論, De Civitate Dei)"에서 아풀레이우스의 책 "변형담(Metamorphoses)"을 "황금당나귀"라고 부르며 조롱했습니다. 참고로 "변형담(Metamorphoses)"은 완전한 형태로 남아있는 유일한 고대 로마의 라틴어 소설로, 마법 실험으로 우연히 당나귀로 변한 청년 루키우스의 우스꽝스러운 모험을 담은 상상 속의, 현실사회와 무관하면서 재미있는 작품입니다.
아우구스티누스는 특히 "데몬들은 신계(神界)의 중개(仲介) 권력들이다."라는 아풀레이우스의 믿음을 조롱하면서, "유일한 중개권력은 예수 그리스도뿐이다."라고 서술하고 있습니다.

6. 현대에서의 "데몬"

오늘날 "데몬"들은 컬트나 오컬트 문화에서 주도적인 역할을 맡고 있습니다. "데몬"들은 악마로 인식되고 있고, 살아있는 생명체를 지배할 수 있는 힘을 가진 것으로 여겨지고 있습니다. 고대 그리스의 장난꾸러기 목양신 "판(Pan)"의 이미지는 기독교 민간전승에 의해 19세기에 오컬트 문화와 사탄주의의 상징인 이교도 신 "바포멧(Baphomet)"으로 되살아 났습니다.
"바포멧"은 11세기와 12세기에 "마호멧" 또는 "무하마드"의 변형으로서 처음 등장했는데, 그 이후 14세기에 성전기사단(Knights Templar)의 종교재판(inquisition) 판결문에 이교도 상징을 의미하는 용어로 기록되어 있습니다. 그 이후 "바포멧"은 한 쪽 팔은 들고 있고, 한 쪽 팔은 내리고 있는 것이 상징하는 것처럼, 남성과 여성, 천국과 지옥, 밤과 낮 같은 이중성(二重性)을 나타내는 존재로서 "유다염소" 또는 "사탄"과 연결되어 왔습니다.
"데몬"들이 그러한 것처럼, 수호천사들은 타락천사들로 대체되어 왔습니다. 여러분들의 어깨 위에는 천사라고 불리는 것, 양심이라고 불리는 것들이 있을 겁니다. 하지만 조심하세요! 최악의 경우에는 그것들이 여러분들을 지배해 버릴 수도 있을 것입니다.

고린도전서 10장 [개역한글]
1 형제들아 너희가 알지 못하기를 내가 원치 아니하노니 우리 조상들이 다 구름 아래 있고 바다 가운데로 지나며
2 모세에게 속하여 다 구름과 바다에서 세례를 받고
3 다 같은 신령한 식물을 먹으며
4 다 같은 신령한 음료를 마셨으니 이는 저희를 따르는 신령한 반석으로부터 마셨으매 그 반석은 곧 그리스도시라
5 그러나 저희의 다수를 하나님이 기뻐하지 아니하신고로 저희가 광야에서 멸망을 받았느니라
6 그런 일은 우리의 거울이 되어 우리로 하여금 저희가 악을 즐겨한 것 같이 즐겨하는 자가 되지 않게 하려 함이니
7 저희 중에 어떤이들과 같이 너희는 우상 숭배하는 자가 되지 말라 기록된바 백성이 앉아서 먹고 마시며 일어나서 뛰논다 함과 같으니라
8 저희 중에 어떤 이들이 간음하다가 하루에 이만 삼천 명이 죽었나니 우리는 저희와 같이 간음하지 말자
9 저희 중에 어떤이들이 주를 시험하다가 뱀에게 멸망하였나니 우리는 저희와 같이 시험하지 말자
10 저희 중에 어떤이들이 원망하다가 멸망시키는 자에게 멸망하였나니 너희는 저희와 같이 원망하지 말라
11 저희에게 당한 이런 일이 거울이 되고 또한 말세를 만난 우리의 경계로 기록하였느니라
12 그런즉 선 줄로 생각하는 자는 넘어질까 조심하라
13 사람이 감당할 시험 밖에는 너희에게 당한 것이 없나니 오직 하나님은 미쁘사 너희가 감당치 못할 시험 당함을 허락지 아니하시고 시험 당할 즈음에 또한 피할 길을 내사 너희로 능히 감당하게 하시느니라
14 그런즉 내 사랑하는 자들아 우상 숭배하는 일을 피하라
15 나는 지혜 있는 자들에게 말함과 같이 하노니 너희는 내 이르는 말을 스스로 판단하라
16 우리가 축복하는바 축복의 잔은 그리스도의 피에 참예함이 아니며 우리가 떼는 떡은 그리스도의 몸에 참예함이 아니냐
17 떡이 하나요 많은 우리가 한 몸이니 이는 우리가 다 한 떡에 참예함이라
18 육신을 따라 난 이스라엘을 보라 제물을 먹는 자들이 제단에 참예하는 자들이 아니냐
19 그런즉 내가 무엇을 말하느뇨 우상의 제물은 무엇이며 우상은 무엇이라 하느뇨
20 대저 이방인의 제사하는 것은 귀신에게 하는 것이요 하나님께 제사하는 것이 아니니 나는 너희가 귀신과 교제하는 자 되기를 원치 아니하노라
21 너희가 주의 잔과 귀신의 잔을 겸하여 마시지 못하고 주의 상과 귀신의 상에 겸하여 참예치 못하리라
1 Corinthians 10 [NASB]
For I do not want you to be unaware, brethren, that our fathers were all under the cloud and all passed through the sea;
and all were baptized into Moses in the cloud and in the sea;
and all ate the same spiritual food;
and all drank the same spiritual drink, for they were drinking from a spiritual rock which followed them; and the rock was Christ.
Nevertheless, with most of them God was not well-pleased; for they were laid low in the wilderness.
Now these things happened as examples for us, so that we would not crave evil things as they also craved.
Do not be idolaters, as some of them were; as it is written, "THE PEOPLE SAT DOWN TO EAT AND DRINK, AND STOOD UP TO PLAY."
Nor let us act immorally, as some of them did, and twenty-three thousand fell in one day.
Nor let us try the Lord, as some of them did, and were destroyed by the serpents.
Nor grumble, as some of them did, and were destroyed by the destroyer.
Now these things happened to them as an example, and they were written for our instruction, upon whom the ends of the ages have come.
Therefore let him who thinks he stands take heed that he does not fall.
No temptation has overtaken you but such as is common to man; and God is faithful, who will not allow you to be tempted beyond what you are able, but with the temptation will provide the way of escape also, so that you will be able to endure it.
Therefore, my beloved, flee from idolatry.
I speak as to wise men; you judge what I say.
Is not the cup of blessing which we bless a sharing in the blood of Christ? Is not the bread which we break a sharing in the body of Christ?
Since there is one bread, we who are many are one body; for we all partake of the one bread.
Look at the nation Israel; are not those who eat the sacrifices sharers in the altar?
What do I mean then? That a thing sacrificed to idols is anything, or that an idol is anything?
No, but I say that the things which the Gentiles sacrifice, they sacrifice to demons and not to God; and I do not want you to become sharers in demons.
You cannot drink the cup of the Lord and the cup of demons; you cannot partake of the table of the Lord and the table of demons.

영문성서에 데몬은 고린도전서 10장에 등장하는데,
예수를 광야에 쥴리처럼 목뒤잡고 끌고가 40일간 시험한 데빌도 데몬이지만,
데몬으로 언급한 것은 고린도전서 바울의 언급이 공식이라,
10장 초장에 구름은 아펩신의 구름 침대고 언급되는 내용이 아펩신전용이다.
7절부터 10절까지는 4층Djed으로 비롯된 네가지 사건화다.

11 저희에게 당한 이런 일이 거울이 되고 또한 말세를 만난 우리의 경계로 기록하였느니라
12 그런즉 선 줄로 생각하는 자는 넘어질까 조심하라

춤추는 자와 Djed 똑닮은 두 아펩뱀 받들고 있어 거울을 언급했고,
서있는 자가 넘어진 자로 변한 것은, 서있는 아펩뱀과 누워있는 아펩뱀 지칭한다.

7 .........백성이 앉아서 먹고 마시며 일어나서 뛰논다 함과 같으니라

앉아있는 것은 누워있는 아펩뱀이고, 일어난 것은 서있는 아펩뱀이지만,
출애굽기 금송아지 사건을 소환해서, 일어난 것은 태양신전 하토르신들이다.
앉아있는 때는 아펩신전에 있으니 문제될 게 없지만,
일어난 것은 태양신전 하토르화 된 사건이라 우상숭배에 해당한다.

그러나 아펩신전을 벗어나지 않기에, 일어난 것은 서있는 아펩뱀이라,
사람이 아펩뱀화된 것과 같다.
바울은 이것에 대해,

29......어찌하여 내 자유가 남의 양심으로 말미암아 판단을 받으리요

29절로 대응한다.
자유대로 하라는 뜻이다.

25 무릇 시장에서 파는 것은 양심을 위하여 묻지 말고 먹으라
32 유대인에게나 헬라인에게나.......

시장과 유대인, 헬라인이 함께 소환된 것은 합체 아펩신전 에피소드라 합체된 제물(합체된 아펩뱀)임을 알았을 때, 오염된 제물이라, 어둠은 먹고, 번개는 못먹고를 판단하는 것은 양심과 자유의지에 있다는 얘기다.

20 대저 이방인의 제사하는 것은 귀신에게 하는 것이요 하나님께 제사하는 것이 아니니 나는 너희가 귀신과 교제하는 자 되기를 원치 아니하노라
21 너희가 주의 잔과 귀신의 잔을 겸하여 마시지 못하고 주의 상과 귀신의 상에 겸하여 참예치 못하리라

이방인은 춤추는 자고 해서 귀신(demon)은 번개를 뜻한다.
the cup of the Lord and the cup of demons
여호와 Lord의 컵은 Djed이 떠받들고 있는 아펩뱀(어둠)이고,
데몬의 컵은 춤추는 자가 떠받들고 있는 아펩뱀(번개)이다.
the table of the Lord and the table of demons
여호와의 탁자는 Djed이 떠받들고 있는 아펩뱀이고,
데몬의 탁자는 춤추는 자가 떠받들고 있는 아펩뱀이다.

다시 소크라테스로 돌아와서,
데몬은 소크라테스가 섬기는 제우스 관련한 번개가 맞지만,

1. 국가(아테네)가 인정하는 신을 신봉하지 않고,
2. 새로운 신격을 수입한 죄를 짓고 있다.

새로운 신격은 번개 외 어둠밖에 없다.
이것이 아낙시만드로스(Anaximandros)의 '아페이론(ἄπειρον, apeiron)'이다.
우주의 근원으로 불멸하는 무규정자 혹은 무한정자를 의미.

이집트 하토르신전 지하의 합체 아펩신전이 소크라테스로부터 시작했다는 뜻이지만,
유대인들은 어둠신을 믿는 것이고,
헬라인은 번개신을 믿는 것이고,
바리새인은 번개신 믿고,
사두개인은 어둠신 믿고,
사마리아인이 합체신 믿는다.

소크라테스 대화법을 산파술(maieutike)이라 하는 이유도,
Djed이 산파역활이다.

15 애굽 왕이 히브리 산파 십브라라 하는 자와 부아라 하는 자에게 일러
16 가로되 너희는 히브리 여인을 위하여 조산할 때에 살펴서 남자여든 죽이고 여자여든 그는 살게 두라
17 그러나 산파들이 하나님을 두려워하여 애굽 왕의 명을 어기고 남자를 살린지라
18 애굽 왕이 산파를 불러서 그들에게 이르되 너희가 어찌 이같이 하여 남자를 살렸느냐
19 산파가 바로에게 대답하되 히브리 여인은 애굽 여인과 같지 아니하고 건장하여 산파가 그들에게 이르기 전에 해산하였더이다 하매
20 하나님이 그 산파들에게 은혜를 베푸시니라 백성은 생육이 번성하고 심히 강대하며
21 산파는 하나님을 경외하였으므로 하나님이 그들의 집을 왕성케 하신지라
22 그러므로 바로가 그 모든 신민에게 명하여 가로되 남자가 나거든 너희는 그를 하수에 던지고 여자여든 살리라 하였더라
Then the king of Egypt spoke to the Hebrew midwives, one of whom was named Shiphrah and the other was named Puah;
and he said, "When you are helping the Hebrew women to give birth and see them upon the birthstool, if it is a son, then you shall put him to death; but if it is a daughter, then she shall live."
But the midwives feared God, and did not do as the king of Egypt had commanded them, but let the boys live.
So the king of Egypt called for the midwives and said to them, "Why have you done this thing, and let the boys live?"
The midwives said to Pharaoh, "Because the Hebrew women are not as the Egyptian women; for they are vigorous and give birth before the midwife can get to them."
So God was good to the midwives, and the people multiplied, and became very mighty.
Because the midwives feared God, He established households for them.
Then Pharaoh commanded all his people, saying, "Every son who is born you are to cast into the Nile, and every daughter you are to keep alive."

부아(Puah)는 프타(Ptah)신이라 Djed 역활이고,
모세의 처 십보라가 산파 십보라(Shiphrah) 춤추는 자 역활이다.

소크라테스가 두 역활 모두를 소화하면서
아낙시만드로스는 Djed 역활로,
플라톤은 춤추는 자로 갈라진다.
플라톤이 스파르타 출신이라 아테네가 이겨서 두 국가를 섬기는 입장의 춤추는 자 된다.
춤추는 자 머리에 태양이 있어 희람신화에서는 아폴론 역활이다.
수학계에서는 3대 작도 불능 문제 중 하나를 사람들에게 풀지 않으면 전염병을 고쳐주지 않겠다고 한 것도 아폴론이다.

눈금 없는 자와 컴퍼스를 유한 번 사용하여...
I. 주어진 임의의 각을 3등분한 각을 작도하시오.
II. 주어진 임의의 정육면체의 두 배 부피를 가지는 정육면체를 작도하시오.
III. 주어진 임의의 원과 같은 넓이를 가지는 정사각형을 작도하시오.

Djed과 춤추는 자의 반석이 콤파스와 눈금없는 자의 유한 번 고대 수학문제 원본이다.

아폴론은 음악의 신이기도 하니 음악으로 배틀대결을 하기도 했다. 그래서 대결한 자 중에 '마르시아스'란 악사가 있었다. 아폴론은 리라로, 마르시아스는 피리로 대결을 했는데 마르시아스는 평범한 사티로스였다. 어느 날 올림포스에서 아테나가 피리를 개발해 불었는데 옆에 있던 헤라와 아프로디테가 웃었다고 한다. 아테나는 궁금해하다 피리를 부는 자신의 모습을 연못물에 비춰봤더니 피리를 부느라 볼이 부푸면서 얼굴이 괴상하게 되는 것을 그제야 알아챘다. 은근히 유리멘탈이다 화가 난 아테나는 피리를 던져버리면서 이 물건을 줍는 자에게 불행이 있으리라 저주를 내렸다.(...) 때마침 지나가던 마르시아스가 이 피리를 우연히 주웠다. 이 저주받은 악기를 수준급으로 연주하게 된 마르시아스는 지나치게 자만하여 아폴론에게 음악대결을 신청한다. 아폴론은 대결을 하기 전 지면 무슨 대가든지 치르기로 했다.

대결의 심판은 산신과 뮤즈들이었다. 마르시아스의 실력이 허세는 아니었던터라 둘이 막상막하였다고 하나 심판은 아폴론이 무서워 결정을 내리지 못했는데, 아폴론은 갑자기 리라를 거꾸로 들고 연주하더니 불쌍한 마르시아스에게 피리도 거꾸로 들고 연주하라고 했다. 피리를 취구 이외의 부분에 불어봤자 소리가 날 리가 없으니 당연히 마르시아스가 지고 말았다. 결국 아폴론은 마르시아스를 나무에 거꾸로 매달아 산 채로 가죽을 벗겼다. 마르시아스의 피와 그 자리에 있던 사람들의 눈물이 강을 이루었는데, 그 강의 이름은 마르시아스 강이라고 한다. 이 내용은 그림으로 많이 묘사되었다.

마르시아스가 아펩뱀 역활이다.
춤추는 자 마르다와 이름이 겹치는 것도 신약이 희랍신화 도용했다는 뜻이니,
합체 아펩뱀 숭배하던 소크라테스도 신약에 상당 기여한게다.
소크라테스는 독배도 태양신전이 아니라 아펩신전에 있다.

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